Back in September '99 sr111 board members asked an actual airline mechanic (not associated with swissair)to comment from his perspective on what the process of the installation of the IFEN might have been like. If I remember correctly he hadn't seen van Beveren's translated articles which revealed additional information regarding SBA (Santa Barbara Aerospace) or for that matter information about Hollingsead (the actual installers).

Barb. I will address the comments in several sections,
with the main
question you indicated addressed
last. Keep in mind that these are only my
humble thoughts on these issues and others may have different
experiences or opinions. Also, that these views are as I
know them with the few US airlines
I have worked with or know people at. SwissAir could very well
operate completely differently.

==================================

Regarding which bus the IFE was wired into:

From
their point of view: "why would the pilots need to know
that?" Sure,they would know about the
IFE being installed, what breakers it was supposedly
hooked to, and how to operate it. But I
doubt they would have been told specifically that
it was connected to the wrong bus.

My experience
with pilots has been exactly as Stuart says. I've
found myself
asking them about technical specifics
(beyond the cockpit indications), and
usually, they reply to the effect that they just fly'em, not fix'em,
which is my job.

As example, I have worked
shifts where I was part of the crew meeting the
aircraft as they came into the gate. We are usually advised ahead of time via aircraft-to-operations
communications (ACARS) if they encountered any
problems in flight, so we usually have a good idea of what to expect
in terms of any problems before they are even on
the ground. But even so, we still need to query
the crew about specifics. If they received some kind of
fault message or trouble light, we have to
ask about the circumstances it occurred under,
and what they did, and if, or how they remedied
it.

They sometimes try to get technical, but mostly once
the discussion gets
"out of the cockpit", so to
speak, they are pretty much just nodding along
to get me back into a more familiar area for them (the
cockpit). Please don't interpret this as saying they
are ignorant or complacent. Far from it!
But just as I know how to "fix'em", I don't really know how
to "fly'em". I know the principles, and how all
the equipment "works", but I don't have the
knowledge or the background of all the necessary technical
specifics to be a pilot. It's too much to expect me, or
a pilot to maintain a professional
expertise level of proficiency in both fields at the same time.

The only pilots I really know of who do fly'em
and fix'em are mechanics who have a private
pilots license in general aviation and fly their own
small planes. Although I did know an avionics
mechanic about 5 years ago who had experience flying
C-130's for several years in the military. He did
eventually get into another airline in pilot training, but
he is the only exception I personally know of
who is a commercial pilot with real, practical
experience and knowledge in aircraft mtc.

The road to
being a commercial pilot is usually by one of two ways.
Through the military, or through a professional pilot training school. There are several of these around the
country, and going this route is stressful and
expensive. Either way, the focus is on flying, not fixing,
and I see this same focus show in their
professional attitudes every day. Here's a link to one of
the really popular pilot schools.

http://www.embryriddle.com/

They also have programs in ATC and Aviation
Mtc.

Another resource for finding out about how to become a
pilot is ALPA's

website.

http://alpa.org/internet/cpb/index.htm target=new>

Getting back to the question of how much information is
given the pilots about the mtc technicals; There IS
a sharing of information between the
maintenance and flight operations divisions, but at an
administration level. From there the info is filtered down
through directors, managers, supervisors, etc, so
that only the portions relevant to flying the planes
are passed on to the pilots in the forms of bulletins, procedures,
checklists, and revisions to their manuals. In this fashion, just as Stuart outlined, the pilots are not inundated in an information
overload. If they had to memorize EVERY miniscule technical detail of every document from maintenance (in
addition to the MANY general flying bulletins they receive),
their minds wouldn't be able to focus on the flying part of flying.

It also works the other way. The exchange of
information from the flight
operations division to the
maintenance personnel is also filtered down by
maintenance management so that only the portions of the "flying" bulletins which concerns maintenance
procedures eventually makes it down to the maintenance
technicians in the form of bulletins, and manual
revisions.

==================================

However, I imagine that this fact SHOULD have been noted
in the aircraft's maintenance records, so at
least the mechanics SHOULD have known about
it.

The maintenance records for each aircraft should
indicate that the system had been installed as
instructed, and in accordance with (IAW) engineering
document #1234. In other words, the installation
technicians would have attributed procedural
responsibility for their work to having followed the
instructions outlined in the "approved" document which
authorized and specified the system's
installation.

If the installation document says to install it
wired to "A" bus, and the mechanic installs it
wired to "B" bus, then the incorrect installation is
the mechanic's fault (and maybe more than one were
involved), along with his supervisor, the airline's mtc
inspector, and the final authority (in the
U.S. it would be an FAA inspector) who would have ALL needed to
have signed off on this kind of installation as
performed to specifications and to be
airworthy before the aircraft could be put back into regular revenue
service.

But if the document specifies the "B" bus, and the
mechanic wires it to the
"B" bus (as instructed by the
authorized installation document), but really
this turns out to be the wrong bus to use, then fault goes back
to the original installation document, which
includes its author, his supervisor and the authority
who approved it (internal inspector, and maybe the
FAA if they signed off on the engineering
paperwork).

There is a mtc logbook on each aircraft which
must be kept current on each aspect of mtc which
has been performed on that aircraft. Even down to a
record of how much oil each engine is serviced with at
the gate in between flights. In the case of a
major installation like an IFE, the record would
be initiated by saying something like "Replacement of A
passenger entertainment system with B system needed IAW
engineering document #1234." The action performed would
then show "A entertainment system removed and B
system installed IAW engineering document #1234. B
system operationally tested per AMM 23-30-XX-500,
inspected per AMM 23-30-XX-600, and approved
for service." It would then show the appropriate authorization
signatures and license numbers for the approving
authority (like a supervisor or
inspector if warranted). There would not be any other info kept in the
aircraft mtc logbook specific to this installation. The
mechanics can, however, access that engineering
document #1234 if they need to. Their access to it
will vary from airline to airline, but usually, they
don't need to see it anyway. The info they will
need will be how to maintain an already
installed system, and this info will be located in the mtc
manuals.

Aircraft Mtc Manuals are set up according to a set of
standards devised by the Air Transport
Association.

http://www.air-transport.org/
In this system (basic overview), any time a mechanic
needs to find anything in the mtc manuals, or make
a reference to it in his paperwork it is indexed
numerically with this system.

The mtc manual is divided into 5 main sections.

Section 1 - Aircraft
General
Section 2 - Airframe Systems
Section 3 -
Structures
Section 4 - Power Plant
Section 5 - Miscellaneous

For each item in the mtc manual, it will contain
passages indexed according to what they relate to by
CHAPTER:

Sect 1
Chapt - Description

05 - MTC
CHECKS
06 - DIMENSIONS & AREAS
07 - LIFTING &
SHORING
08 - LEVELING & WEIGHING
09 - TOWING &
TAXIING
10 - PARKING & MOORING
11 - REQUIRED
PLACARDS
12 - SERVICING

Sect 2
20 - STANDARD
PRACTICES, AIRFRAME
21 - AIR CONDITIONING
22 - AUTO
FLIGHT
23 - COMMUNICATIONS
24 - ELECTRICAL POWER
25 -
EQUIP & FURNISHINGS26 - FIRE PROTECTION
27 - FLIGHT
CONTROLS
28 - FUEL
etc, etc, etc, etc......

Within
each of these chapters, the information is then broken
down again into sub-directories of SECTIONS.
Here's an example from Chapt 26 (a really
Short one):

10 Fire Detection System
-11 Engine Fire
Detection
-12 APU Fire Detection System
-13 Lavatory Smoke
Detection System
-14 Lower Cargo Fire Detection
System
20 Fire Extinguishing System
-21 Engine and APU
Fire Extinguishing
-22 Lower Cargo Fire
Extinguishing
-24 Portable Fire Extinguishing
-25 Lavatory
Disposable Fire Extinguishing

A third number group
follows which is established by the manufacturer to

itemize info within the sections. But then the info is
assigned another
number (SUBJECT) according to what it
addresses:

000 - DESCRIPTION & OPERATION
100 - TROUBLE
SHOOTING
200 - MAINTENANCE PRACTICES
300 - SERVICING
400
- REMOVAL / INSTALLATION
500 - ADJUSTMENT /
TESTING
600 - INSPECTION / CHECK
700 - CLEANING /
PAINTING800 - APPROVED REPAIRS
900 - DEACTIVATION /
REACTIVATION

So, the code for where to find the procedure to
replace a faulty lavatory
smoke detector would be to
look in 26-13-??-400 of the AMM.

This generally
describes how the aircraft mtc manuals are coded to
standardize how the information is stored and referenced.
Going by this, you might be able to see that
something like maintenance of the IFE system will
be broken up and scattered around a lot of places (but the
majority in Chap 23). In the aircraft mtc manual,
there wouldn't be any one, single place where the
ENTIRE IFE system is addressed as a whole, complete unit
in full detail. And it would even have portions
of it addressed in different manuals, too.
Finding out exactly how it is wired (which bus, and where
it connects in) would not even be in the
"aircraft" mtc manual, but in the wiring diagram manual
(WDM). Which is a manual of schematics and info on the
wiring and electrical systems.

However, some
airlines have internal dedicated support "repair shops"
whose sole functions will be devoted entirely to a
single component or system. For instance, many
airlines will have a shop dedicated to avionics and
communications/entertainment systems. These shops will have "Component Mtc Manuals" which are complete manuals from the individual
manufacturers of these "after market" components on how to
repair them from the simplest
repair, all the way to
a complete rebuild of the component.

I have doubts SwissAir would have shop authority to do ANY real
maintenance to the IFE systems. And I believe any
component mtc manuals they have for it
will simply be for reference and not for performing actual mtc on
the systems (my humble guess). The usual
arrangement for a complicated system like this, is for
the manufacturer (IFT) to have a mtc contract with the
customer (SwissAir) in which SwissAir will
have authority for simple troubleshooting,
replacement of simple components, and selective
deactivation/reactivation as needed, but they (IFT) are responsible for any major work needed. Especially regarding anything which
might involve the whole fleet like software
updates, system reconfigurations, fleetwide
hardware changes, etc. In the mtc contract case, IFT would still be
held accountable for the system, but the argument could still be made that SwissAir is ultimately
responsible for everything on the planes they fly.
It's really a muddy area with this kind of arrangement, and I
just don't know the legal particulars, myself
(just fix'em, remember).

Perfect example: I've done work on aircraft with
on-board passenger phone systems and I was not
authorized to actually do ANY mtc to the phone system
other than troubleshoot via a system master control
panel. This was due to the service contract our
airline had with that phone service provider.
ANYTHING associated with taking any part of the system
apart or replacing components required a call to
the their local Service Rep (they kept one on
call AT the airport) to be called out to check the
system and fix it, then sign it off in the mtc
logbook. If it wasn't possible to get a rep out, then
the phone system was usually locked out (deactivated)
and placed on the mtc deferred list, to be fixed
at the next station with an on duty service rep
available who could fix it and sign it off for
service.

Back to the issue of the installation engineering
documents. Don't get me wrong. It's understood that
mistakes can exist in the "approved"
installation documents, and believe me, if I was following one that said to install the wings upside down, I would go ask
some questions, but sometimes when you are part of
a large, possibly multi-shift crew, some things
just aren't as obvious as you might think. I'm not
making excuses for the IFE's incorrect installation
(if it really was installed incorrectly), but without
firsthand knowledge of how that system was installed and
maintained, I'm staying open to all the possibilities.
I'm also leaving the door open to the possibility
Swissair’s own mtc technicians weren't any part of the
installation process (as I have read reports of), and
therefore wouldn't technically be responsible for a
mistake in the actual installation (like incorrect
wiring procedures).

Going back up, and re-reading
the question, (sorry to have gotten so in
depth),
deciding the level of awareness he is asking about depends
on which "mechanics" he is referring to and
which mechanics ultimately did the actual
installation. IFT's? Or Swissair’s? AND whether or not there
is/was any contractual agreement with IFT for mtc of
the system?

I know this probably isn't the
exact answer you were looking for, but
hopefully the extensive explanation I detailed as a lead in
shows why.
==================================

Do you know if those records are available in the
public domain, or have they been
subpoenaed, or cannot be released due to being part of
investigation? It would be
very interesting to find
out.

I am very certain the actual mtc records for that
aircraft would NOT be
readily available to the public.
If they have even been recorded electronically
(my airline does this, but not all airlines are at
the same level of technology regarding record
keeping), then you can be sure they
would only be accessible to Swissair’s internal computer network, and even then probably still protected through access
privileges. As I understand it, after an accident,
representatives of the investigating authority will
personally show up at the airline and ask to see ALL records
for that aircraft. I don't know if they take the
original documents (that's my guess) or copies. If
they DO take the originals, I don't know if the airline keeps
a copy of all the documents taken(again, I would guess so), or not.

Getting copies via subpoena (discovery?) of mtc documents, would
probably mean going to the investigation authority if
they have taken the "original" documents. I just
don't have any particular experience on this one. Sorry
I do not know more about the legal parts of
this issue, I can only guess. But it's a sure bet
that the mtc records would not be available via any
on-line sources, and that even obtaining legal copies
of them (as needed in
litigation) could likely be subject to going through the accident
investigation authority for legally acceptable
copies.

As an aside; In the usual case that many of the
agencies responsible for investigating a crash are
usually responsible to the public for establishing
that they are performing a thorough, and extensive
investigation (TSB, NTSB,
etc.), they may decide to
publicly release certain mtc records details as a
show of good faith. This (I suspect) is also done to
address media speculation when it arises, as we saw
with IFT and the leaks which pertained
to the TSB investigating their system and its installation. The media is always asking first about the mtc records of the
aircraft after an accident, and the investigating
authority is sensitive to appeasing the press's
persistence to get answers to these questions.

One last thought I will finish with on the bus
issue. If it turns out the
IFE was designed to use
the wrong bus, then in my opinion this error goes
back to the designer, and engineering approval of the
design documents. Even if the installer(s) followed
the installation instructions to install it to
the wrong bus, the original error and fault is still
upstream of the installation in this case.

If
the cause is found to be the routing of Tefzil and
Kapton wires together, then this (to me)is most
likely the installer's fault. If the installation
document specified this routing, then a share of fault
does go back to the designer and approving
agencies, but in this case, the installation
technicians should have known well enough to not mix these
wires together in a routing bundle. This situation
goes back to my example of the upside down
wings installation. This is just as obvious to me.

Just my
humble opinions.

________________________________________________

Reading this type of information is helpful in getting a rounded perspective on what may - or may not - have happened. Thanks for providing it.

You're welcome Ivy. Since the mechanic was nice enough to explain how the process works regarding add ons, other information regarding the IFEN came to light. If you have an opportunity, check out the threads that have information from the journalist van beveren as well as the David Evan's interview with the FAA. The FAA in that interview states clearly that the IFEN should never have been installed on the MD-11 because it used too much power. Also it clearly states in the 1996 DOT report on gambling that the system should not be installed into essentials. If that isn't ironic enough, it even mentions IFT (the designer of this system)and their new 'safe' system(go figure). Also, check out the report the FAA wrote following the crash regarding the IFEN. The airline mechanic's comments are very helpful but don't tell the whole story. I also want to mention that I heard a rumor a long time ago that srtechnics did actually participate in the installation of this system to some degree. That I cannot verify but the source was decent. Hopefully more information will be exposed in the future.

Thanks BF. Will do.