Here is a very interesting conversation that took place on the old sr111 board. I thought it was worth taking the time to put this thread together and taking out unrelated messages that were posted in between. It makes for some interesting reading and thought provoking questions surrounding the installation of the IFEN on the sr111 aircraft. I haven’t edited the messages except I’ve removed most of the names of the posters though I’ve replaced them with an initial so that one can follow the thread more easily.

H:
Rob has done a splendid job on showing up the
links on the SBA affair, and on the possibility, that
they knowingly decieved the FAA and bent the rules.
What bugs me now is, have they done so with SwissAir
too? Has bought SwissAir into something different they
had believed it was?
This are only my personal
assumptions and ideas, hypothetical, but might be helpful in
unravelling the whole mystery of flight SR111. I will try to
be objective, neutral, as far as one can be, and I
do not want to hurt anybody's feelings. But how
could an airline with an excellent reputation buy such
a flawed product, the IFEN?

Let us go back
to to 1996. Switzerland not being part of the
European Union, where the 'privatized' national carriers
are fighting it out against each other. All those
countries are much bigger, and their airlines have a
lucrative domestic market, where they can generate their
revenue without to much serious opposition. Besides that,
they have a big internal source of potential customers
for the international flights. A French will prefer
Air France, a Brit BA and a German of course
Lufthansa. And all those of course compete on the same
destinations, to the US, to Asia, to Africa and the rest of the
world. Those big ones can absorb losses on one or more
routes and cover it with the earnings from
others.
Airlines are companies like any other. They have their
investors, which expect a return on their money. If you put
money into a savings account with your bank, you expect
to be paid interests, and the bank has to make sure,
that it delivers, else it will go out of
business.

SwissAir as a smaller airline with a limited domestic
customer base had to look for new measures, to consolidate
its customer base and attract new customers. They had
the reputation for an excellent service, but was that
enough? At that time, the 'personal' Inflight
Entertainment systems emerged. Not that clunky TV hanging from
the ceiling, bad picture quality, and limited to one
movie at a time, which most of the passengers did not
want to see anyway. I must admit, I never watched
them.
Marketing at SwissAir was looking for something, to excel
the airline from the competition and make it more
attractive to a potential customer. If the price for the
flight ticket was the same, the add on values as
service, food and a new gadget, a personal Entertainment
System could do the trick.
I assume they looked
around on the market, on what was on offer. And they
were asking for a bid. I assume, they were not the
only ones at that time to shop around, and suppliers
of those systems tended to rather prefer the big
players. But that is just my opinion. When the SwissAir
workgroup looked the offers over, they might have been much
to expensive and delivery and installation far into
the future, not in the timeframe that they had hoped
for. But there was one offer from an American company
that looked attractive. Quick delivery and
installation by that company, and it offered something the
others did not have. Gambling. Ok, it is only an added
on software, instead of a movie, you had the
gambling channel, but if I remember correctly (Rob?), part
of the installation was being paid by sharing the
revenue of the gambling.

2 b continued

I do not know, how the internal decision process
at SwissAir is being handled or had been handled.
Could only be pure speculation from my side. I can only
apply on how it would have been handled in my
company.
First of all, a commission would be founded, with
management members from the different departments involved.
I this case, it should have members from
sales/marketing, legal, flight operations, technic, industrial
engineering, safety and finance. Most members of such a
commission do not have any insight into technical matters,
even a senior manager from the SR Technics must not
necessarily be an expert. They just envision the 'big
picture', but they of course can draw the experts from
their respective departments and have their own
workgroups. They have to look and compare at various issues.
There are the initial costs of the systems, the costs
of ownership, return on investment, technical
safety, handling and operating the system, reliability,
downtimes, repair and maintenance, and acceptance and
marketability. If the system has already been installed
somewhere, one looks it up and tests it 'hands on'. If it is
new, one still looks up similar projects/installs of
the companies in question. All the gathered
information is poured into comparing reports, and based on
them, a proposal is made for one system. Even if there
would only be only one contestant, such a study has to
be made. To evaluate on technical aspects, a
blueprint of the wiring diagram had to be provided, so that
the technicians have a look at it, and can give their
input on feasability and safety, especially, when it is
something new. It is a lengthy and time consuming process,
not being done in a few days. Now that is the
procedure, that I know has to be followed in the companies I
had been working for. I assume, that in Switzerland
the companies follow the same rules. Swiss people are
known for their precision, are known to follow the
rules, are known as law abiding and quality fanatics,
and extremely orderly and reliable. I have been to
Switzerland very often in the past, and one could count on
those qualities. like Germans, but much friendlier,
except for the language (no offense).

And here
is, where I get that big question mark between my
eyes.
If Swissair had followed these procedures, that
entertainment system would have been discarded. It would never
had made it. Have they bought something different
than was finally delivered? Have they been misled by
SBA, or had their been a flaw in the decision making
and in buying that system? And once they had
themselves committed to it, and finding out, pulling the
stops had to high a price tag to it? How much did the
SRTechnics electrians were told or let known and shown? And
at what level were they involved in the
install?

Me: H, Thanks for your thoughts on this system.
One almost gets the feeling from reading through the
various articles about this system, that swissair
directed this whole process albeit even if it was
haphazardly. They set out determined to have this system
installed and even when problems arose carelessly plowed
ahead. Certainly they had to have been informed or
noticed (their technicians) that this system was a huge
power consumer. It almost seems as though from looking
at the D.O.T. 1996 report, that orginally the IFEN
was to be installed into the cabin
bus.

(continued)

I would guess, but I'm not sure if I am right,
that on the 747 this presented no problem. When it
came time to install the IFEN on the MD-11s it was
discovered that to power this system up they had to go to
the essential bus in order to run it. At this point,
the entire idea should have been discarded because
the IFEN was incompatible with the MD-11. But alot of
money and time had already been invested in this system
and there was no turning back. Karl Laasner and his
marketing crew had already sent out press releases and it
would prove to be an embarrassment to swissair if they
were to turn back. Plus they were desperate to edge
out the competition because the company wasn't doing
very well at the time. To keep up with other airlines
they needed something different to attract customers.
The idea of making huge profits off of the gambling
feature must have been very enticing for all involved. It
was like a run away train once it got started with
all caution and concern for safety tossed aside.

You bring up an excellent question. What was extent
of SRTechnic's involvement in the installation of
this system?

A friend of one of the victims:
I would still like to know: Was the wiring
changed from cabin bus to an essential bus, and WHO ok'ed
it???????

Why......to get the system up and running to beat competitors
and make money for the investors.

Another
comment: someone out there knows the answers to many of
these questions.......why haven't they come
forward??????

Me:
H, Do you think that the pressure to get this system installed quickly might have come from top management at swissair or s'air group?

H:
Barbara,
If I remember correctly, the IFEN had
been initially been designed for a 747, and my guess
is, it was to be powered from the cabin bus, which
could take the load. Now comes my question, when did
IFT and those involved in the install discover, that
the MD11 cabin bus could not provide the power
needed? As I remember, IFT had a similar (?) system
installed in Alitalia MD11's. Was it a 'smaller' version
(without gambling), or only for a selected few (1st class,
maybe bizz), and connecting to the cabin bus did not
pose a problem? If Alitalia was an earlier install,
had they already figured out there, that the cabin
bus was not the source to deliver enough power?

My personal view is, that the original blue print
had it connected to the cabin bus, and during the
install/testing, they found out, that the cabin bus did not
deliver. Then of course, SR was already committed.
Marketing had informed the flying public of the new cool
features awaiting them, and the system had to be made to
run ('Just fix it!'), and someone had the bright
idea, to hook it up to the essential bus, as that
delivered enough power. Did they know of what they were
doing? IMHO, it more looks like a 'backyard' install, a
makeshift when it comes to the power hook-up. Throwing in
the CB's to connect and disconnect, and having that
only on the pre- and postflight checklist, but not on
the emergency checklist. Looks to me more like a DIY
job, made under much pressure. The comparison with the
runaway train hits it right on the mark. There had been a
time to stop it, but when that was missed, it just
developed its own momentum and couldn't be stopped easily
anymore. To much at stake.
How much had been SRTechnics
involved from the technical side? Did someone there came
up with the idea to hook it up to the ESS? They at
least must have been familiar with the electrical
characteristics of the MD11, which Hollingsead I assume was not.
And when a new power source was needed, they pointed
it out? Not aware that they compromised the
electrical design philosophy of the MD11, or believing the
CB's would fix it?
I assume, that SR technicians
had to be trained on maintaining the system, and
therefore, they had to be involved on the install, but at
what level were they? Somebody from SR must have been
supervising the install, it was their planes, and they needed
to know and ensure, that it was done correctly. Who
made the decision on using the bus and approved it?
Somebody must have signed it off. The more I think about
it, the more questions I
have.

Unknowingly, or under pressure against his knowledge.

Me:

H a question that really haunts me is why did
the 'parking list' reflect the need to switch off the
circuit breakers to take the power off the IFEN but
nobody bothered to update the emergency checklist? It
raises some disturbing questions such as (and this is
just one possibility) was it purposely left out so as
attention wasn't focused on the crazy way it was installed
and the awkward way it needed to be turned off? Or
was it more likely just omitted carelessly like the
installation iteself? Of course cbs weren't meant to be
switches as any technician would know.

H:
Barbara,
The pressure must have come from the
Swissair management, which of course was under pressure
from SAir to improve on their financial results.

IMHO, the decision was made at SR, but at what
management level is a good guess. I am sure, that top and
higher management, if they applied pressure (fix it! We
do not care how! But fix it!), did not apprehend the
technical side and its complications.
It could even be,
that the decision was made at a lower management
level, being informed that the system had to be
installed and running within a defined timeframe. There is
a slight chance, that outside SRTechnics management
nobody was aware of a problem, though IMHO, I doubt it.
I do not believe, that the 'floor management' made
the decision on itself, but it can not completely
ruled out, much depends on the corporate culture within
SR. But with a 'show stopper' of that magnitude, it
must (should?) have been brought to the attention of
the top and higher management.
And someone had to
deal with the BAZL, which is not the job of the 'floor
people'. The other option is, that the SR technicians were
imbeciles and unprofessional, which is highly
undoubtful.

Me:
You have a good point H. A 'floor person'
wouldn't have dealt with BAZL which would prove to some
degree that someone higher up was aware of a problem. It
is interesting that articles regarding BAZL's early
approval of these systems mention that much of the IFEN
was covered up preventing them from getting a good
look at this system and it's installation. Sounds as
if BAZL was pressured into approving this system as
well IMHO. Now who would have been able to do that if
it is true?

H:

Barbara,
That had been a topic on the other
board, and we had not come to conclusion either. It is a
haunting riddle. The rules have it, that the installer is
responsible for the update of the checklists. But when the
pre and post checklists were updated, why did nobody
at SR noticed the discrepency? No blame on the
pilots, they have to fly the plane, and not being experts
in electrical installations, mechanical
installations. They are no technicians, and a plane is a very
complicated beast.
But it is a very good question. Was it
sloppiness or on purpose? Somebody knows the answer to that,
but I doubt, we will be told.

Me:
I doubt we will ever know the answer to that one as well. It certainly seems out of character for an airline that prides itself in precision and perfection. In fact so does the entire IFEN story.

H:
Barbara,
My guess is, that middle management
from the SRTechnics side would be sufficient for
contacts with BAZL, but the upper management would be
aware of it. And the upper management of SRTechnics
would inform the rest of the Swissair upper management
on the problems and progress. At least I assume that
as common practice within companies.

But to
throw in more weight with BAZL, of course one can send
in someone from upper management, which could speed
up the process. IMHO,moving it from a more technical
level to a more political level. Somebody had to 'sell'
the SBA approvals and a pending FAA certification to
BAZL.

It disturbes me too, that part of the install were
already covered up, when BAZL did an onsite inspection.
Especially, that the power hookup was already covered up.
That is normally the last job to do, hooking up to the
power source. One has to check the integrity of the
installed wires and attached peripherals, before connecting
them to the 'hot end', to make sure that there is not
a short somewhere. Just a safety
rule.

H: Totally agree on that one. It seems so unreal.

M:

"...why haven't they come forward??????"

Oh, C, really, I can think of sooooooooo many reasons.

F:
Barb, anyone,

Has any heard anything more
on the test results from the airflow tests? I
understand that the TSB was to perform the tests on a MD-11
with the ifes active to monitor the airflow within the
panels to predict what path a fire may follow, but
haven't heard anymor on it.

Person #1 from Switzerland:
Excuse me but what do you mean by
"...why haven't they come forward??????"?

D:
Do you think that the pressure to get this
system
installed quickly might have come from top

management at swissair or s'air group?

Anybody
who has an occupation in a technical field as I do
has had to, at one time or another, deal with a
manager who has no technical knowledge but who imposes
deadlines and goals anyway.

You know the type I'm
sure. They have no technical knowledge, nor do they
care to, but they impose deadlines based upon what
they want to see without a care of what it takes to
meet their unreasonable deadline.

This type of
thing happens every day, and I'm sure SwissAir is no
exception. I have this mental picture of a manager or a
small group of managers patting themselves on the back,
congratulating themselves for a successful installation, while
the lowly technicians, who well could have been faced
with a "do it or look for a new job" situation, shake
their heads and pray to God that nothing goes
wrong.

QUESTION : How long was it between the time of the
installation of the IFEN on SR-111 and the crash?

Me:

D, It was installed about a year before the crash. I can certainly picture the scenario you described.

Me:

To my knowledge F there has been no new information released regarding test results from the airflow tests.

Family member sr111: The results aren't in yet, per my meeting with the TSB last week.

(My own note here- family members were never informed of the results of these tests nor were they told that they were conducted except via the press)

S:
Barbara, H: are you both suggesting that
Swissair management, and particularly their Marketing
department, pushed and hurried the installation of the IFT
system, even though they knew of techical reasons why it
should NOT be installed? I'm trying to follow your
arguments here, and I find it hard to believe that they
would have gone to THAT extent. I mean, I have seen
previous duscussions questioninf Karl Laasner's heavy
pushing of this system, and his ighly questionable
purhcase of shares in IFT at the more or less the same
time that the deal was signed, but now it looks like
you are suggesting that he and his team did all this
DESPITE having technical info that indicated that the IFT
system was not compatible with the MD-11?

That
would imply gross technical incompetence on the part of
the marketing folks, and perhaps even criminal
negligence (or whatever the legal term is), and I'm having
trouble accepting that. I mean, yes maybe they tried to
hurry it up to start making money on it, but to
actually force it on the airline against the technical
folks? That's a bit hard to swallow.

S:

H, your post gives me the impression that you
think the pilots were not involved at all in the whole
IFEN thing: that they were just sort of told "It's
back there, and don't worry about it: the cabin crew
will handle it". All they had to do was push the
breakers in after start-up, and pull them out before
shut-down.

I think you have a very valid and
importnat point here: The pilots had no idea about the
immense power load that the IFEN placed on their
essential bus, since they were left out of the loop
entirely, and no reference to the IFEN was ever made on any
of their emergency checklists, so there was no
reason for them to ever suspect that the IFEN might be
the problem when the smoke started coming into the
cockpit. That would explain a lot: the pilots just never
knew what was going on. So I'm not surprised by their
actions: they had no idea of what was really going on with
thier electrical system, or that following the
checklist was a big mistake! How could they know, if they
had never been told, and never trained on the IFEN
system?

Me:
S, I think it is shocking that the pilots
didn't have an emergency checklist that informed them of
how to turn off that system. Can you imagine being
Urs Zimmerman with an escalating fire and having no
idea that you haven't turned off the very source of
that fire...(if indeed it is the case that the IFEN
was the ignition source). Someone a while back said
that the pilots received a bulletin about the system.
This seems to have been the only time the pilots were
told anything about that system if it is true. Even if
suddenly Urs Zimmerman thought, oh wait a minute I just
thought of that bulletin sent to me months and months
ago...I'd better hit those circuit breakers which is real
doubtful when the man is totally overcome with the
conditions in the cockpit, it may have been too late because
the mylar blankets caught on fire possibly causing an
inferno in the cockpit. Sounds to me as if the swissair
pilots were left totally in the dark about the IFEN.

Me:
Stuart, I just thought of another thing.
Zimmerman also had a rather tedious emergency checklist to
deal with which has since been changed by swissair.It
seems extremely odd to me that swissair's checklist
would be long (perhaps longer than any other
airlines..certainly Delta's)and yet the IFEN shut-down wasn't
mentioned. I guess I just don't get it. Seems as though
between the checklist being too long and involved, and
the IFEN not even mentioned, the terrible outcome
isn't that much of a surprise.

M:

I also can think of many reasons.

But, I can hope that SOMEONE who knows will read these postings, and come forward and open up the can of worms.

Me: Remember S, Karl Laasner was called by SR
technicians according to Van Beveren (FACTs article), Mr.
IFEN. I would suppose that he would have to be pretty
involved in this system and having it up and running, to
earn that title. I didn't think that normally
marketing individuals showed up at an installation site in
the first place, let alone shooing technicians away
as was suggested by Van Beveren after he conducted
interviews at SRTechnics. Please correct me if I am wrong
regarding this. You're right though, it is darn hard to
swallow that the marketoids would be this involved in
something so clearly out of their league.

Person from Switzerland #1:
What do you mean by
"...why haven't they come forward??????"

Thanks

M:
If I may offer my opinion: I think it's not that
"they knew of techical reasons why it should NOT be
installed," rather they *didn't want to know.* They got it
approved, so it must have been okay, right?
: (

Me:
It seems as though swissair continually boasts
that the FAA approved this system and it's
installation as though that lets them off the hook. In the
end, it was up to the airline to deliver their
passengers (and crew) safely to Geneva on September 3rd of
'98. I think the management may have forgotten those
'seats' were human beings because their vision was
obstructed by dollar signs. Just my opinion of course.

Person from Switzerland #1:
The IFEN is to 99% the cause of the accident. But you will never know it for sure. Everybody believes the IFEN was the cause but it hasnt been made official yet.

Thanks

S:
Barbara, I seem to remember that the reason for
the long Swissair checklist was supposed to be
related to the long over-water flights that they do
regularly, where the nearest airport for an emergency
landing might be an hour or two away, so the checklist is
designed to include absolutely everything, to give them a
chance to find the problem on the way to the closest
airport. It's not supposed to let them fix the problem,
but at least to find it and take it out of
operation.

Which is why your comment highlights a very surprising
thing: if the checklist was supposed to include
everything, but did not include ANYTHING about the IFEN (even
though it was such a huge electrical load), then someone
in Swissair management screwed up really badly by
not updating that checklist. Could it have been a
result of the Marketing department pushing to get the
system in service urgently? It would be very interesting
to see what Swissair's normal policy is (or was?)
for updating paperwork when a major change is made on
one of their planes!

The point you made about
the pilots "training" on the IFEN being limited to
just a memo is also pretty scary! In an emergency,
pilots are trained to react instantly and automatically,
following procedures that have been tried and tested AND
PRACTISED numerous times in simulators. You go through it
over and over again, until it becomes second nature,
and you don't even have to think about it. So if
Zimmerman and Lowe had never been trained on the new
procedures for the IFEN, then they would certainly not have
been thinking about memos that they had once received,
many months before, in the middle of an emergency!
Instead, they would follow instinct, the trained and
practised procedures that had been drilled into
them.

It occurs to me that the possibility that the IFEN
might be causing the smoke, probably never even crossed
their minds. They were probably very confused as to why
the procedures they knew so well, and were following
correctly, just were not working. They never knew that those
procedures just COULD NOT work, since they were designed for
a plane with no IFEN!

Very worrying. They
never had a chance.

S:
Too right Barbara! You don't want a marketing
guy, who is totally incompetent technically, running a
complex technical project like this, any more than you
want a mechanic running a marketing campaign! Big
mistake, both ways. From those reports that you mentioned,
it sure looks like certain individuals inside of
Swissair had an inordinate amount of power, and also
conflicts of interests. I wonder if there has been any
internal restructuring of management, lines of
responsibility, etc, since SR111?

Me:
"I wonder if there has been any internal
restructuring of management, lines of responsibility, etc,
since SR111?"

That is a darn good question
Stuart. I certainly haven't heard of any, but maybe
someone else would know?

T (directed to person from Switerzland #1)

S: If I may respond to that.

You
are right that the cause of the crash hasn't been
made official yet. Nobody is arguing with you about
that.

The real point of these IFEN discussions
has to do with WHY an accessory of this complexity -
a substantial & integral part of the aircraft's
electrical system - was approved with little or no study of
it's compatibility. (In this case, to the
MD-11.)

It's quite obvious that the installation wasn't
entirely and properly inspected by authorities, and that
the flight test lasted one or two days at best
(please don't anyone tell me the flight test was only a
few hours).

Does that mean that the bulk of
the engineering analysis was done while it was spread
on a warehouse floor?

These are issues that
concern everyone while they are flying. And we don't need
to wait for an aircrash or investigation results to
initiate discussions about it.

There are marvelous
new technologies that companies want to market to the
airlines, and that passengers want to use. But if this is
the way they get installed... then we don't want
anything to do with them.

So for now, the issue
about the IFEN being implicated, is a non-starter. We
are talking about the certification
process.

A family member:
The investigation is not complete. Who knows what
they will be able to determine, as to the
cause?

I'm not sure about your statement saying "Everybody
believes the IFEN was the cause"...is an accurate one,
because I've never said that to be the case. I've
said...it's something the TSB is looking closely at, no
more..no less.

So? 'Everybody' hasn't pointed a
direct finger at the IFEN. Just doesn't look that great,
when you have all the information at your disposal
that some of us have. Visual inspections
included.

In my opinion? It's just one aspect of this
nightmare to look very closely at.

Person from Switzerland #2:
After reading that interesting IFEN-Stuff, there
are some of my thoughts (no more after this):
I
think there is a little missunderstanding about
emergency proceeds on a MD-11. Some of you pointed out,
that this checklist should have been changed because
the IFEN-Installation. I dont see the need for it, if
the IFEN would be hooked properly on a non-essential
bus.
Why that? The MD-11 cockpit is fully automated. In a
case where you suspect an electric fire you dont start
to turn system by sytem off. This was done in the
oldern days like on a DC-10. It was the flight-engineers
job to do this.
Now on a MD-11 you start to turn
in one go a couple of systems off: Step one turn the
non-essential bus off, step two, three and four the pilot turns
the smoke/air-switch. In the end the pilots would be
able to turn the electric energy for IFEN away, but
not at the first possible step (turn non-essential
off).
Thats what I think why the FAA called it out "the IFEN
doesnt meet the emergency-philosophy of the
MD-11".
Even if swissair would have changed their checklist
and said: in step xxx you have to take the fuses for
IFEN out" it wouldnt be good enough, actually it would
be pure nonsens, because the emergency-philosophy
for the MD-11 works different.
The other point is
the huge electric ammount the IFEN needed. Is that
principally a problem? No, nearly every system wich is
running through an essential bus is factually a high
power consumer. Every single system there is from their
electric violation power a possible fire source. If one of
these systems has a short and start to sparc, the
pilots have absolutely no chance to finde the source
out. The only way to make any contradict actions is to
use the famous smoke/air switch.
Thats the core
problem of the IFEN-Installation: hooking the system on
an essential bus took the chance away to deal with
an electric problem at the earliest possible stage.
This is what I think the FAA means: the
IFEN-Installation itself was not automatic dangerous, but it was
not the best possible way for an emergency
routine.

The other thing is the rerouting of some
cockpit-cable bundels in the swissair MD-11s. I thing thats a
serious matter and has nothing to do with a "marketing
gag". So far I know, this rerouting-programm was
developed together from sair-technics and boeing. The main
focus is so far I unterstand on the electric cable for
the flight-horizon and the emergency-power-unit-cable
(and others, of course).
I heard, that the
propeller for the emergency power unit was driven out, but
the emergency-power generator couldnt get not
electric power, because the cable from that unit was
burned. If this cable would be in an other place (the
fire in the cockpit was not everywhere, it was highly
concentrated), the emergency unit could maybe have worked. We
all know, what this means...
Kind regards

S:
Good point, Fred! That's the key to the whole
issue, as you point out: if the IFEN had been connected
properly (to the cabin bus), then there would have been no
need to update the checklists, and the pilots would
have not needed re-training in emergency procedures.
But the fact is that the IFEN really was NOT
connected like that, and was instead hooked up to an
essential bus.

So, either it was hooked up like
this "by accident" (meaning that the mechanics who
connected it didn't know the difference between the cabin
bus and the ess-buss and picked the wrong one out of
ignorance, which would be EXTREMELY worrying), or the
installation was actually planned this way, designed in
advance to be connected to the ess-buss, in which case
there *was* a need to require re-training of the pilots
and re-working of the checklist. Since that never
happened, there are numerous questions that need to be
answered, but the basic key is this: was it an installation
error, or was it a design error?

If it turns out
that the installation really was designed this way,
then considering that the FAA later stated that this
design is "...not compatible with the design philosphy
of the MD-11...", there is obviously a major issue
with how such a huge mistake could have been made in
the approval process, whereby an "incompatible"
installation method and procedure was approved.

Since I
don't think anyone is saying that the mechanics were
incompetent and just picked the wrong bus in error, we get
back to what Rob was saying: there really was a major
problem in the initial approval stages, which allowed a
stupid and dangerous design to get approved. This, in
turn, lead to later errors (no mods to the pilot
training or checklists, etc.).

As always happens
in these accidents, there was a chain of events that
led up the real cause: if any of the links in this
chain had been broken, then the accident would never
have happened.

SO, in my opinion, the way to
fix this fault is not really to patch the checklists,
retrain the pilots, or re-wire the aircraft, since that
does not address the basic issue. These are all
important things to do, sure, by they don't fix the root
cause. The REAL fix here has to be focused on the whole
documentation and approval process. Figure out what went wrong
in the approval process. If you find and fix the
problem in the approval process that allows faulty
designs to be approved, then you have prevented all
future recurrences of not only this type of accident,
but of *any* kind of accident that could arise out of
incorrect approval of *any* type of faulty design. To me,
that is far more important than just replacing one
type of wire with another.

Family member #2:
Stuart I agree with you on both points. First the
emergency procedures would most certainly have to be
updated to coincide with the installation of this
system.
Second, and more IMPORTANT, I Believe is that the
root cause of all of this is.... THE SHODDY AND
HURRIED INSTALLATION AND APPROVAL PROCESS. The FAA ISSUES
AND OVERSEES LICENSING TO OTHERS........and they
obviously need to pay much closer attention to those that
they license....as you have stated this system should
have never been installed in the manner that it
was.....the engineers should have seen a problem with this
immediately but it sure appears that all everyone was
concerned with was the time frame of installation and
startup operation......this is quite evident with the
facts that show the first flight after approval
was....2 DAYS....
As I have stated before it is high
time for the immediate revamping of the FAA...it
appears to me they have authority and don't use it and
nobody oversees their practices!!!!!!!WHO HOLDS THE FAA
ACCOUNTABLE??????? Sounds like the flying public has to because
nobody else is. The problem with this is it is very
difficult to do...ya know in the private business world if
you or I ran a company like this we would be out of
business in no time at all....!!!!!!!!

S:
(Family member#2), you bring up an excellent point there:
The mandate of the FAA is part of the problem, and I
really do agree with you that they need to be
re-shuffled, shaken up, and re-built.

To me, the basic
problem is that the FAA has a mandate to not only promote
safety, but also to promote the well-being of the
airlines, which to me are two exactly opposing concepts. It
is kind of like making the Consumer Protection
Council (or whatever you call it in the USA) also
responsible for the financial performance of Ford and General
Motors: on the one hand, they have to ensure that cars
are built safely, but on the other they really can't
do anything that would hurt the car builders, like
ban a certain model of car, or levy huge fines on the
manufacturer, or put in place safety regulations that would
make cars more expensive!

In my opinion, the
FAA should be split into two totally separate
organisations, one of which makes and enforces the rules as they
see fit, and the other to promoted the interests of
the airline industry. Or maybe the FAA should just
hand over the rule-making job to the NTSB?

L:
I will add on with one crucial question: What
kind of evidence is there , telling that the SR111
crew indeed did not pull the CB for the IFEN quite
early on in this event. In particular: What
says
that Zimmermann did not know that the IFEN was hooked
up onto the essential bus - and hence
that
working thru the SEAS switch was a no-go action
with
the IFEN still connected?
I mean, a normally
curious pilot might start doing some thinking on his own,
once he learns that there are some special aspects
involved in the power up/down checklist (i.e. working the
CB�s).

On the other hand, if the IFEN was still connected
when the SEAS switch was rotated, there would
have
been a great opportunity for a power surge (and lots
of Amps in critical wires) when the IFEN got powered
up again.

Person from Switzerland #2:
I totally agree with your comments about the
IFEN. The whole certification process has to be looked
at verry closely to prevent such events in the
future (but will it really happen?). And of course the
people wich where responsible for it should be
held.
Sometimes I ask myself if this case is really the only "bad
apple" or maybe only the "top of an iceberg"...
I
dont agree with your oppinion about the
cocpit-cable-rerouting. If it shows that the original cable design of the
MD-11 has a safety problem, then it is a verry
important matter.

Why? The IFEN is not anymore a
risk, because it is turned off for ever. But there are
still about 180 MD-11s in operational service
worldwide...
Kind regards

H:

L,

We will only know, if those CB's have
been salvaged, but that is NOT the point
here.

That particular type of IFES was unfit for an MD11, it
did NOT belong into that kind of plane.

The
pilot is NOT an electrician or an avionics technician.

Do you know, how the electric / electronics
interface in you car and how they work?
Or can you
explain, how your TV works, and if it breaks down, can you
find the fault?

A pilots job is to fly the
plane, that is, what they are trained and being paid
for.
NOT with starting to fiddle around in emergencies.
When there is an emergency at hand, there is no time
for guesswork or experiments.
That is why there
are the Checklists. To ensure that in an emergency
they have to approach the matter in a methodical way,
and not to grope in the dark.
If the disabling of
the IFES had been on top of the 'smoke list', the
catastrophe might have been avoidable. But it was not even
mentioned!

'Switching on' and 'switching off' the IFES with CB's does
not indicate at all, where it is connected to, which
bus it is using.
BTW, you can protect a system
against electrical surges, therefore the SEAS switch was
not a 'no-go'. For some industries, those electrical
loads are 'peanuts', they have to deal with a much
higher surge.

The fact stays, that the IFES was
incompatible with the MD11 design, and should never have been
'approved' and installed.
IMHO, the reason that 229
people had to die lies in the approval and installation
process, not what the pilots should have guessed and
done.

Mark: While I agree that the FAA's processess need work
and maybe even that their structure is fundamentally
flawed, I feel obligated once again to caution against
blaming the police for the crime. The parties that must
be responsible for safety are manufactueres and
operators of the air fleet. With respect to the IFEN, we
know that there were serious gaps in the certification
process, but these are only evident because there were
serious flaws in the engineering process. Furthermore,
these appear to have been the result of pressure from
the top (of Swisssair). Econonmic concerns were given
greater priority that safety. It may even be the case
that the certain individuals had greater concern for
personal personal gain than for the welfare of their
company or their passengers. There is undoubtedly an FAA
oversight problem, but let us not allow those who should be
accountable deflect scrutiny by scapegoating the FAA.
-
Mark

L:
There are individuals who only obey orders
and
those who think further. This goes for all the
SR
pilots who lacked very basic insight in electric aspects
- hence accepting to fiddle with
CB�s when they
in reality should have objected.
I bet that they
same guys also know nothing about
Kapton....knowing
nothing, pointing the nose for
disaster. Poor
guys!
I say again - what if Zimmerman indeed did
cut
out the IFEN very early in this event, but
that
e.g. a cable fire was already irreversably ignited,
let be in part due to the IFEN. What
difference
does it then make, whether it was hooked up here or
there, into the electrical buses?
Lots of speculation
here has been based on the
unfounded assumption
that the IFEN remained connected to the essential bus
throughout the whole event. I just hope that the
investigators dont do the same simple mistake.

Of course
, the IFEN shouldnt have been connected
the way
it was. But suppose that SR111 crash never
had
happened - who would have cared the least about the
aspects of how to connect things in an
aircraft? In
other words - just how many other flaws are there,
flying around over the world in this very minute? Could
it be that those flaws happen to be much more
relevant?

H:
Mark,

I agree with you, that the FAA is
not the scapegoat and should not be painted as the
bad guy. The have their rules and procedures which
they followed and which they thought, would be
adequate to control the industry, and up to that time, it
had worked more or less. There were gaps, known and
unknown, but they were not exploited.
But with the
right 'components' coming together, who did just that,
the FAA will (I hope) draw the lessons from it, and
will (have) to adjust the rules and procedures.
If
a body (corp, gov, etc) is setting down rules,
procedures and laws, sooner or later, someone will try to
find a gap, a hole, and make use out of that knowledge
for his/her own (financial) advantages. Rules,
procedures, laws have to be flexible, and have to be adjusted
all the time.

H
S,

Since that never happened,
there are numerous questions that need to be answered,
but the basic key is this: was it an installation
error, or was it a design error?

Since it
had been installed on ALL in the same way, I intend
to believe, that it was intentional, by design. If
it would have been an installation error, ther
should be some planes with the IFEN hooked up to the
cabin bus, and others (or only one) with a hook-up to
the ess. And after the mechanic installed it, a
supervisor had to re-check. Besides, they were working on
several machines at the same time! There is a chance,
that it was always the same person, who connected the
IFEN to the bus, and the same supervisor, who ok'ed
it, but IMHO, not very likely. The mechanic worked
with the help of a diagram, which is essential when
you install some components. Even in a car, when you
want to install something later, e.g. a radio, you
need to know, where to tie in. Without a detailed
wiring diagram, you just do not start.

Me:
I have to agree with you on that H. I hope
that the FAA will make a big effort to fill in those
gaps (in this case huge gaps). There will always be
those however, who take advantage for their own
financial gain, of a weakness in any given government
system. That's what I believe happened in the case of
this installation. swissair was going to push this
thing through..no matter what.

Family member #2:
H,
I disagree that the FAA is not the
bad guy here....they were and are a big part of the
problem today.....Just look at Alaska air, they had been
having problems, as well as other airlines with the
stabilizer on those planes, the FAA made suggestions to
inspect and gave the airlines far too much time to do
this, it wasn't until the accident that they finally
forced them to do it and quickly. Once again a reactive
agency instead of proactive.
I am not saying that
the others are not to blame such as Boeing, the
engineers, or Swissair but the FAA is a huge part of the
problem.
NOW it is TIME for the rules to be adjusted, the
FAA should be more proactive starting
immediately.

H:
Barbara,

As I see the 'components' acting
together:

(When I say, SBA/IFT or SR, I do not mean those
companies as a whole, only 'interested
groups/individual