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Grounded by politics at the FAA
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Posts: 2580 | Location: USA | Registered: Sun April 07 2002Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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From the Valujet Family Memorial Site:

May 1, 2003

President George W. Bush United States White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

This letter is in reference to what I believe is a national safety and security issue. I wrote to you regarding my concerns shortly after your inauguration, but I never received a response. I have not re-addressed the issue with you due to the events of September 11 and the Iraqi war. Now that those events are mostly behind us, and you are turning to domestic issues, I implore you to address these problems before the American public is forced to endure another airline accident.

The issue of concern involves the degradation of aviation safety in this country and the continuing lack of adequate safety oversight by the responsible government agency, FAA Flight Standards Service. This lack of oversight is coupled with an unwillingness to correct safety problems, even to the extent of willingness for cover-up when problems are found. This unwillingness to act results from years of unethical practices and government abuse of those who attempt to correct safety problems, specifically in the Northwest Mountain Region. I�m not in a position to speak for the other regions, but based on my first hand knowledge of what occurs here, I�m certain similar cases can be found across the country.

For your review and background information, I have attached several documents that will go into the details. You will find current problems regarding FAA management�s abusive and corrupt practices in my testimonial document to Mr. Kevin V. Ryan, US Attorney for Northern California. As you are probably aware, he recently re-opened the criminal investigation against Alaska Airlines. My testimony traces a path back to the source of the problem, the FAA Flight Standards Northwest Mountain Region and Mr. Brad Pearson, the Division Manager.

When reviewing my documents, please make note of how FAA managers actively retaliated against inspectors who tried to make a difference and save lives. Also please understand that the FAA managers involved all have questionable backgrounds, including assault incarceration, perjury, numerous sexual harassment charges, charges for stealing government property, actions contrary to public law such as destroying evidence or failing to document safety violations, and so forth. Those that are the worst offenders receive the highest promotions for which the flying public is paying a very high price. They should be a real embarrassment for our government. The government should be willing to take disciplinary action against those involved in creating the culture that allowed Alaska Airlines to kill 88 loved ones, but so far nobody has held Mr. Pearson and others involved, accountable.

Lastly, I was a victim of retaliation by these unethical and corrupt FAA managers. After being one of the high achieving and notable female commercial aviation pioneers in this country, the FAA went to great lengths to discredit me following attempts to correct major safety infractions prior to the Alaska Airlines flight 261 accident. I have virtually lost my aviation career. Furthermore, the FAA continues to sabotage my employment attempts. I have attached my bio for your review.

To sum it up, first, I respectfully ask that those FAA officials involved in years of cover-up in the FAA Flight Standards Northwest Mountain Region be rightfully punished and replaced by ethical, unbiased FAA managers who have the willingness to serve the people of this country as the people expect to be served.

Secondly, I ask that you rightfully reinstate my career with the FAA, and that my financial losses rightfully be recovered from the FAA.

Thank you for your time and attention in this very serious matter of safety. If you have any questions, please feel free to have your staff people contact me at 206-244-6099 anytime.

Sincerely,

Mary Rose Diefenderfer

10639 Glen Acres Dr. S. Seattle, WA 98168

cc: Marion C. Blakey, FAA Administrator Representative Defazio Senator McCain Senator Grassley Senator Santorum Senator Boxer Attachments:

Letter to Mr. Kevin V. Ryan Mary Rose Diefenderfer Bio Letter to the Editor

March 13, 2003

Mr. Kevin V. Ryan United States Attorney Northern District of California 450 Golden Gate Ave., 11th Floor Box 36055 San Francisco, CA 92102

Dear Mr. Ryan:

This letter is in reference to your re-opened investigation of the crash of Alaska Airlines 261. It contains pertinent information about the FAA�s contributory actions in that crash. This information will also point to possible criminal activities on the part of FAA officials who allegedly assisted Alaska Airlines in preventing FAA inspectors from discovering safety deficiencies, from making the appropriate reports, and/or from pursuing safety violations against the airline. This occurred both in Seattle and in Oakland. Although my testimony regarding these activities is contained in NTSB records, this letter is intended to remind you that the FAA created an environment that allowed such alleged criminal activities to take place, and may have even assisted the airline through actions against inspectors. These points should be examined while you are conducting your thorough investigation, as they are an integral part of the chain of events that led up to the accident. The evidence will point to cultural problems within the FAA that allowed safety deficiencies at the airline to occur.

I am a former airline principal operations inspector (POI) of the Federal Aviation Administration in Renton, WA, the office that has oversight responsibility for Alaska Airlines. In my former capacity, I had main operational oversight and legal signatory authority for Alaska Airline�s operational approvals from 1993 to 1997. This is the timeframe for which Alaska Airline�s alleged criminal activities are in question.

Prior to the crash, I provided testimony to the Office of Inspector General, FAA Administrator, and others, which pointed to gross mismanagement by FAA officials, abuse of authority, and even potential RICO activities by FAA officials in Renton with regard to safety deficiencies at Alaska Airlines. My testimony, and that of others, was not only ignored, but those testifying found themselves subjected to retaliation for their reports, some even losing their careers, while the FAA perpetrators received promotions and bonuses. An independent investigation was conducted by the Airline Investigation Unit (www.airlineinvestigationunit.com) that arrived at the same conclusions. The final report contained specific evidence from both before and after the accident, but FAA leaders also ignored that evidence.

From the early 1990�s until the crash of Alaska Airlines 261, principal operations and maintenance inspectors assigned to the airline identified and reported an increasing trend of significant, if not extremely serious safety violations, combined with an increasing arbitrary and regulatory non-compliant stance by the airline. This included knowingly making false statements about the conduct of airline programs and employee training, completion of safety qualification training that was never actually initiated, falsifying pilot and instructor training records, not fulfilling legal employee training requirements in accordance with FAA approved training programs, using unapproved de-icing fluids (vodka), forcing line pilots to fly below legal weather minimums in hazardous terrain, and creating a culture that encouraged pilots and mechanics not to write up maintenance deficiencies unless it was convenient. This last point resulted in pilots occasionally flying a broken airplane for four or more flight legs. In one case, a pilot knowingly flew a B-737 for four legs with a red gear alert light illuminated in the cockpit. This could easily have resulted in a landing crash. In another case, Alaska Airlines knowing flew an MD-80 for hundreds of flight legs with an internally leaking fuel tank thereby creating the opportunity for a fiery explosion. About the same timeframe, the airline allowed a B-737 to continue to fly with a cracked walking beam, which could have resulted in a take off or landing crash. These broken airplanes were flown with passengers onboard. The specifics are documented in FAA archives.

The airline progressively became more retaliatory against those they considered �problem� or �rogue� inspectors, or those that discovered safety problems, while apparently also becoming progressively more retaliatory against their own internal whistleblowers. This was the beginning of the end of the lives of the 88 souls on Alaska Airlines 261.

FAA inspectors were threatened by airline officials, and were subjected to false testimony by airline officials. In one case, an Alaska Airlines Vice President forced two management pilots to make specific false allegations against an inspector who was processing a violation against the airline. The management pilots did so, but later recanted their claims when they learned the inspector could be fired. This case is documented in FAA Civil Aviation Security files.

Airline officials took an active approach in influencing FAA management in the Renton, WA office to �fix� any inspectors who found deficiencies insisting on a series of severe facilitated inspector reprogramming sessions. While these sessions were ongoing, FAA officials made extreme efforts to silence FAA operational and maintenance inspectors through a hostile work environment, and restrictions on activities and surveillance. Furthermore, they stopped documented violations by losing evidence or simply ordering the inspectors to cease pursing the case. Any inspectors who failed to cease, questioned management�s actions, or made a report to other departments or hotlines, were simply punished and isolated. The leaking fuel tank case, as well as the walking beam case had fines reduced by hundreds of thousands of dollars to under $50,000 after Alaska Airlines CEO threatened an FAA supervisor with a lawsuit. (Any fines over $50,000 are published on the FAA website, and the CEO did not want the violations to be public).

In the Oakland FAA office in the 1997-98 timeframe, an Alaska Airlines whistleblower informed an inspector of an alleged case of falsification of maintenance records in the airline�s Oakland maintenance base. When that FAA inspector attempted to pursue the case, he too was threatened and reassigned by his office manager. The accident might not have ever occurred if the FAA had allowed the inspector to pursue appropriate action, and if the Renton office had supported the finding, which they did not. This is documented in FAA and FBI files.

Ultimately, most of the inspectors who had any oversight responsibility for Alaska Airlines in Renton and Oakland prior to the accident were reassigned to other duties. Less knowledgeable and/or experienced inspectors were placed on the Alaska Airlines oversight team. The new principal operations inspector had an immediate family member working as an accounting executive for the airline and reporting to the CEO. This conflict of interest could only serve to increase Alaska Airlines influence over FAA officials in their safety decision-making. The conflict was reported to FAA officials, but ignored. Alaska Airlines officials applauded the changes.

I was one of the casualties of the agreement between Alaska Airlines and the FAA to subdue inspectors. As POI of Alaska Airlines, I was convinced that the negative safety and regulatory trends demonstrated by Alaska Airlines would result in a major accident. After reporting my findings to local FAA authorities, the OIG and FAA Headquarters in 1997, I was reassigned and endured retaliation to an extent that had not been previously seen in Renton. The retaliation went on from 1997 until 1999, when I was reassigned to a supervisor who had been jailed for an assault conviction. His increasing abuse towards me was condoned by senior management, and continued until I was forced to take a constructive discharge to preserve my career and health. The remaining inspectors learned to keep silent, lest they endure the same fate.

The final result of the Alaska Airlines and FAA management stance against inspectors was a degradation of safety through less oversight and fewer inspections, while FAA management (instead of the inspectors with the expertise) worked out violations. Purging the case from the database usually took care of this. Even after the accident, the FAA manager of the Alaska Airlines oversight team met with Alaska Airlines officials and offered to conduct a �white glove� inspection, but to not document any deficiencies. This is not only contrary to FAA policy, but it is contrary to public law. This is documented in FBI files.

The bottom line is that a very disturbing culture existed and probably still exists within the FAA that allowed the chain of events leading up to this accident to occur. The same FAA officials are in charge, so why should anything change? Those that are no longer in Renton received promotions as a reward for their protectionism of the airline and their retaliatory actions against safety inspectors. Must we wait until Alaska Airlines has another fatal accident to realize that the indicators are present, but nobody chooses to address them once again?

FAA management are experts at explaining away individually documented incidents with claims the employees were �disgruntled�, that �no policy exists�, that they �studied the situation and found no basis for action�, and so forth. The fact is, FAA management was aware of the safety implications of the inspector�s trend identification, did nothing except assist the airline in silencing the inspectors, and 88 fatalities occurred as a result.

I have not used the names of the guilty parties to protect them from any media attention. You can contact me for a list of their names and specific details, but as I mentioned previously, these details and much more are contained in NTSB and FBI files, and in FAA archives. May I also suggest that you subpoena phone records, including cell phone records of the Office Manager of the Alaska Airlines Certificate Management Office (CMO) from the date of the accident until the present date. You are likely to find numerous calls between the FAA Manager and Alaska Airlines attorney�s, CEO, and VPs at irregular hours on a regular basis. This type of activity may or may not be in accordance with current FAA policies, but it certainly is questionable based on recent historical events, the particular manager�s background, and FAA management�s propensity to bury inspector safety recommendations.

Sincerely,

Mary Rose Diefenderfer

10639 Glen Acres Dr. S. Seattle, WA 98168

206-244-6099

CC: FBI, SFO Family members of Alaska Airlines 261 victims Representative DeFazio, Oregon Senator Santorum, Pennsylvania

LETTER TO THE EDITOR, 4/7/02

I worked for the FAA for the last 12 years as an Aviation Safety Inspector and Principal Operations Inspector. While working in the Northwest Mountain Region, I led a team of inspectors who were assigned oversight of a major airline, one that flies hundreds of thousands of passengers a year. This is a story of how politics overrules safety.

As in the case of Alaska mechanic, John Liotine (who�s conscience forced him to go public with safety concerns), I also was forced to reveal government corruption involving selective safety oversight of this airline, and safety problems ignored by FAA management. My commitment to public safety resulted in my being forced out of the FAA. The behind-the-scene destruction of my career is outrageous, and the recent newspaper accounts of airline crashes are testimony to the effect of ousting dedicated, safety conscience FAA inspectors who attempt to protect the flying public.

The FAA is mandated by Public Law to assure that airlines maintain the highest level of safety. Passengers can feel confident that most of the time, he/she will arrive at their destination safely and in reasonable comfort. I, like most FAA inspectors, took this mandate very seriously and worked vigorously for the flying public.

During a four-year period, my team of inspectors and I identified many safety infractions at our assigned airline, ranging from falsification of records and inadequate training, to unsafe flight procedures and failure to document mechanical discrepancies. Time, observation, and responsible investigation clearly identified an increasingly negative safety trend, one that indicated a potential airline disaster if not aggressively corrected. Everybody up to and including the FAA Administrator was provided with numerous reports detailing the problems we identified.

When these facts and the trends were reported within the agency, the FAA management disregarded the accident potential, choosing to react instead to the airline reports of "problem� inspectors. We were reported as troublemakers. FAA management vowed to �fix� the inspectors. Instead of addressing the safety problems, they labeled us �disgruntled� employees. Eventually the FAA removed three inspectors, including myself, from oversight of this airline, and replaced us with less �energetic� employees. These employees understood that career survival required silence about the major safety issues.

After finding safety problems, I endured a political nightmare. I was told I was not a �team player�, I was a �problem�, and I �caused too much work�. I was removed from oversight of the airline with no notice, and assigned to another office with no desk and chair for me. In Russian KGB style, FAA management repeatedly accused me of various false charges and had me �investigated�. During one �investigation�, the Assistant Division Manager made false statements under oath during Federal proceedings. Of course, she was then promoted to FAA Headquarters.

I was illegally ordered not to speak to anyone outside of my office, including my previous coworkers, FAA Security, or higher FAA authorities. I was told I could not make safety reports, a mandate under Federal Law. I had my civil right of free speech violated by those who had an oath to protect the Constitution. I was regularly reprimanded, harassed, and intimidated by my supervisor who is a convicted child abuser, a fact that, incredibly, is known by FAA management.

I applied for transfers to vacant jobs in other regions and was turned down, although I was the most qualified. The pressure forced me to take leave without pay for six months to remove myself from the retaliation. While on leave, I was even harassed at my home. Finally, the FAA unilaterally and without examination, revoked my FAA flight physical, which is required for career advancement, both inside and outside of the FAA. My appeals have gone unanswered. Most recently, a FAA attorney announced that I had been a �problem employee�. The accusation was political nonsense, as just prior to identifying public safety problems with a major airline, I was awarded the FAA�s Distinguished Service Award!

It takes tremendous courage for individuals to step forward to expose information that could prevent a potential air disaster. The negative reaction is obvious. It is an excruciatingly painful and potentially career ending process for those of us who make the reports. Many of us lose our jobs with no actual legal protections- despite the law. The legal fees are horrendous. Our employing organizations protect themselves by discounting us as �disgruntled employees�. They slander us to the press, intimidate our silence, and effectively remove our civil rights. Our co-workers shy away because they fear the same treatment.

People like John Liotine and I expose safety problems, corruption, and cover-ups to protect airline passengers we will never meet, and who will never know we are in a fight for their lives. We do it for the moms, dads, and babies who fly everyday. We do it so we won�t have to read heart-wrenching details of airline crashes and of families suddenly torn apart. We want to prevent the horror that passengers must feel as they hurtle inverted towards the earth, knowing for a brief eternity that they are about to die a very violent death. They don�t have a chance to say �goodbye�. Protecting the families is our only reward, and recent headlines tell the story of too little, too late.

What happens to the FAA management involved in safety cover-ups and harassment of inspectors? Nothing! Justice doesn�t win. Instead, criminal laws are broken TO PROTECT the FAA management. They simply get moved around for appearances, but ironically, they are left in high paying positions where they can do damage to other airlines and safety inspectors. The details of this common phenomenon can be found in the 1994 Seattle Flight Standards District Office Report.

Another disaster is assured; it�s just a matter of time unless the unethical and criminal (U.S.C. Title 18) involvement of the perpetrators is addressed. The FAA, especially the Northwest Mountain Region, needs a complete overhaul. Everyone up to and including the Division Manager must be held accountable for ignoring safety warnings that might have prevented a tragic accident. The FAA managers involved in retaliation of inspectors for their safety reporting must be removed from supervisory positions permanently, or even fired. Some deserve criminal prosecution.

The only viable solution is for the flying public to get involved, demanding action by their elected representatives. Write your Congressperson immediately and demand action, lest you be the next victim of the FAA�s corruption and lack of oversight.

Imagine going to the airport to see that the arriving flight with your family has been removed from the arrival monitor, imagine the sickening feeling when the waiting families are paged to meet company representatives. Imagine the feeling of calling home to explain that "...there's been a problem." Imagine the feeling when you hear the cries and screams on the other end of the phone�.

Mary Rose Diefenderfer, ex-Aviation Safety Inspector Washington

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Posts: 2580 | Location: USA | Registered: Sun April 07 2002Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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