Integrated Preparation to Combat In-Flight Fires Still Needed

"Little progress has been made" in developing an integrated approach to combating in-flight fires, according to a Feb. 26 speech by Wendy Tadros, member of the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada. She was speaking with reference to the Swissair Flight 111 investigation by the TSB. The inquiry into that crash produced some 23 recommendations, many of which focused on the hazard posed by flammable materials in aircraft and other shortcomings in doctrine, training and equipment for dealing with fire (see ASW, April 7, 2003).

"To be sure, airline safety has been enhanced," she said. "Important upgrades, for example, have been made to flammability standards for aircraft materials." Tadros was referring to the improved and more demanding radiant heat and direct flame test promulgated last year by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to qualify thermal acoustic insulation materials.

"But more work needs to be done," Tadros added, going on to outline her immediate concern:

"It will take many years for the airline industry to eliminate all flammable materials on aircraft. We're okay with that - it's realistic to factor in economic realities, and to allow time for technological advances.

"But there are other more immediate steps one can take to mitigate the risk of fire onboard. We would like to see the industry adopt an integrated, comprehensive firefighting strategy for crews.

"Operators believe the industry is capable of developing such a plan, but [they] have been hesitant to initiate change on their own.

"As a result, little progress has been made in this area, despite the important findings uncovered during our investigation.

"It now falls to regulatory bodies such as Transport Canada and the Federal Aviaiton Administration in the U.S. to institute mandatory policies on firefighting in order for meaningful change to come about."

The firefighting strategy Tadros and other TSB officials have in mind is embodied in five recommendations issued by the board in December 2000. (See ASW, Dec. 11, 2000). The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) forwarded the Canadian recommendations to the FAA, but did not issue them as board recommendations. However, the NTSB has issued a number of recommendations related directly the Swissair Flight 111 accident, notably for improved cockpit voice and flight data recorders. In addition, the NTSB has issued recommendations based on other accidents with similar fire-fighting issues identified by the Canadians. The response to these recommendations is distinctly mixed. Based on the demonstrated difficulty in achieving piecemeal improvements, the kind of strategic and integrated improvement the Canadians are seeking could lie many years ahead.

A TSB official said there is particular concern about aircraft vulnerability to in-flight fire in three areas: the cockpit, the electronics and equipment (E&E) bay, and hidden spaces throughout the aircraft. The overall mindset, this official said, is that "any smoke situation is to be considered out of control until proven otherwise." The strategy propounded by the board is to give crews the detection, training and other tools to help "prove otherwise," or fight the fire while preparing to land the aircraft.

The TSB official pointed to Swiss International Air Lines, the corporate successor to the former Swissair, and the steps it has taken - notably the "Modification Plus" program for remaining MD-11s, which provides detection and suppression in inaccessible areas (see ASW, July 30, 2001).

Also, Swiss has implemented more firefighting training, involving both cockpit and cabin crews.

Some of the elements of the TSB strategy were proposed in 1999 by Capt. Ken Adams, who urged a new and comprehensive approach to cockpit and cabin fire safety (see ASW, Nov. 1, 1999).

(For the full text of the TSB's recommendations and the rationale thereof, see http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/saf_actions/Recommendations/FireRecs_2000dec4.asp )

A Comprehensive Firefighting Strategy Five building blocks propounded by the TSB
Recommendation (TSB Rec. #) Status (TSB does not maintain an official status of the type employed by the NTSB. Status below as determined by ASW from multiple sources.)
Review the adequacy of in-flight firefighting as a whole, to ensure that aircraft and crews are provided with a system whose elements are complementary and optimized to provide the maximum probability of detecting and suppressing any in-flight fire. (A00-16) FAA is developing an advisory circular (AC) to provide guidance for aircrews for dealing with in-flight fires (to include in hidden areas). It is yet to be seen how comprehensive that guidance will be.
Review the methodology for establishing designated fire zones within the pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view to providing improved detection and suppression capability. (A00-17) FAA has embarked on programs to improve the means of detecting in-flight fires.
Take action to ensure that industry standards reflect a philosophy that when odor/smoke from an unknown source appears in an aircraft, the most appropriate course of action is to prepare to land the aircraft expeditiously. (A00-18) Contingent on forthcoming AC.
Ensure that emergency checklist procedures for odor/smoke of unknown origin can be completed in a timeframe that will minimize the possibility of an in-flight fire being ignited or sustained. (A00-19) Contingent on actions of individual airlines.
Review in-flight firefighting standards including procedures, training, equipment, and accessibility to spaces such as the attic area to ensure that crews are prepared to respond immediately and in a coordinated manner to any in-flight fire. (A00-20) Part of overall FAA research effort. For a review of considerable activity in this area, see http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/reports/report.stm
Source: Recommendations, TSB

Capturing Critical Data and Fighting Fire Related NTSB recommendations
Recommendation (NTSB Rec. #) Status
Related to the Swissair Flight 111 case directly
Retrofit all aircraft after Jan. 1, 2005, with cockpit voice and flight data recorders (CVR/FDR) capable of recording for two hours and fitted with an independent power source. (A-99-016) OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE
All aircraft manufactured after Jan. 1, 2003, to be equipped with two combination CVR/FDR recording systems, one close to the cockpit and one as far aft as possible, to include independent power backup and capable of capturing controller-pilot data link messages. (A-99-017) OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE
Require that CVRs, FDRs and redundant combination flight recorders be powered from separate generator busses. (A-99-018) OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE
Recommendations based on other accidents with similar issues to those identified by the Canadians
Issue an advisory circular (AC) describing the need for crewmembers to take immediate and aggressive action in response to signs of an in- flight fire. The AC should stress that fires are often hidden behind interior panels, which a crewmember may have to remove or otherwise gain access to the area behind in order to apply extinguishing agent to the source of the fire. (A-01-083) OPEN - ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE
Require participation in firefighting drills involving actual or simulated fires during crewmember recurrent training and that those drills involve realistic scenarios on recognizing potential signs of, locating and fighting hidden fires. (A-01-085) OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE
Develop and require procedures or modifications enabling crewmembers to gain access to areas behind interior panels for the purpose of applying extinguishing agent to hidden fires. Evaluate the feasibility of equipping interior panels of new and existing airplanes with ports or some other means to apply extinguishing agent behind interior panels. (A-01-086) OPEN - UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE (Note: the FAA is researching the utility of access ports into which portable fire extinguishers could be inserted to spray agent onto a hidden fire
Source: NTSB

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Current Regulatory Activity

This is a selective listing of items deemed particularly important. Pay particular attention to the March 1 entry.
Date posted in Federal Register and Document Type Summary of Situation Action Date & Comments
Reminder: Comments to the docket on Extended Range Operations (ETOPS) are due March 15. (See ASW, Jan. 12)
March 3 Final Rule Docket No. 2001-NM-302-AD, transmitting airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-03-33. Flight control system safety. Airbus A300, A319, A320, A321, A330 and A340. Replace pitot probes with revised design to prevent loss or fluctuation of indicated airspeed. Effective April 7. Based on Airbus service bulletin (SB) A300-34-6116 and others relative to each aircraft type. No mention in the final rule of possible further ramifications (beyond the pilots' air speed indicators) of faulty information to the central air data computers. Work deadline: 30 months.
March 3. Final Rule Docket No. 2001-NM-259-AD, transmitting AD 2004-05-07 Electrical system safety Boeing B767 airplanes. Increase wire bundle standoff and install protective sleeving over wire bundles to prevent arcing to structure, consequent fire and loss of affected systems. Effective April 7. Deadline: 18 months. Affected systems not mentioned. Affects 325 U.S. airplanes and 839 worldwide.
March 3 Final Rule Docket No. 2000-NM-170-AD, transmitting AD 2004-05-09 Electrical system safety Douglas DC-9 through MD-88 series airplanes. Inspect for wire chafing and repair as necessary in area of forward cargo compartment. To prevent arcing to structure and smoke or fire in the airplane. Effective April 7. Follow Douglas SB. Accomplish with in one year. Use a hand-held mirror if necessary to completely inspect wiring in the tunnel area.
March 3 Final Rule Docket No. 2003-NM-32-AD, transmitting AD 2004-05-08 Electrical system safety Douglas DC-9 airplanes. Inspect/replace generator relays to prevent arcing and consequent smoke/fire in the cockpit and cabin. Effective April 7. Action mandates Boeing alert SB DC9-24A191, Rev. 2, of Jan. 7, 2003. Accomplish with in 24 months.
March 1 Final Rule, request for comments Docket No. 2000-CE-09-AD, transmitting AD 2001-13-18 R1 Safety of primary structure Raytheon T-34 airplanes. Structural integrity of wing spars, fatigue cracking thereof, and methods of repair to same. SIGNIFICANT: This action VOIDS all previously approved alternate methods of compliance (AMOC). FAA: "We have since determined that those AMOCs do not address all critical areas in the wing spar assemblies." Effective March 15. Comments due April 26. This action represents a complete reversal of the previous course taken by the FAA to accommodate less- costly AMOCs and signifies a crackdown. In essence, the FAA is saying "comply with the AD or don't fly." This action justifies everything said in this publication about the T-34 wing spar corrective actions. (See ASW, Jan. 19; and ASW, Dec. 8, 2003)
Feb. 26 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Docket No. 2003-NM-216-AD Protection against in-flight fire Raytheon model Hawker 800XP airplanes, Hawker 800, and BAe 125 series airplanes. Improper installation of wiring connectors in cockpit could result in both fire extinguisher bottles being discharged into the wrong engine nacelle. Comments due April 12. Manufacturing defect. Comply with Raytheon SB with in 70 flight hours or 30 days, whichever occurs first.
Feb. 26 NPRM, Docket No. 2002-NM-156-AD Fuel system safety Dornier 328-300 series airplanes. Replace check valves with new parts, as leakage could allow fuel vapors to come in contact with ignition sources, resulting in fuel tank explosion and fire. Comments due March 29. FAA action emulates that of Germany's Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA), that nation's equivalent of the FAA. LBA action made Dornier SB mandatory.
Feb. 6 NPRM Docket No. 2003-NM-83-AD Hydraulic system safety Boeing B757 and B767 airplanes. Cracked hangar arm can fail under load when ram air turbine (RAT) is deployed, leading to loss of hydraulic power to primary flight control system in dual-engine failure emergency, with consequent loss of control of the airplane. Comments due March 22. Manufacturing defect affecting about 150 hydraulic pumps, which could be distributed among more than 1,000 airplanes.
Feb. 6 NPRM Docket No. 2002-NM-278-AD Fuel system safety Airbus A319 and A320 airplanes. Modify electrical bonding on fuel return line in each wing. Insufficient bonding may, in certain conditions such as a lightning strike, lead to electrical arcing inside the fuel tank, which could result in fire or explosion. Comply within 60 months per Airbus SB A320-28-1103, Rev. 1, of April 1, 2003. Comments due March 8 (sorry, we just caught this one). FAA action follows that of France's Direction G�n�rale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC).
Source: Federal Register