Airport Rescue & Fire Fighting - Too Little, Too Late

Canadian Michael Murphy has studied the state of airport rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) and found it wanting. He presented his findings at the recent annual meeting of the National Air Disaster Alliance (NADA). Murphy, former regional director general at Transport Canada and founding chair of the Air Passenger Safety Group, titled his ARFF presentation "A Concerned Passenger's Perspective."

Highlights are presented here:

Quick facts on aircraft fires:

41 percent of fatalities involving U.S. aircraft (1991-1998) were fire associated.
Many people survive the crash, only to die from trauma and fire before rescue.
Of 21 emergency evacuations in Canada, 14 (66 percent) took more than 90 seconds, the burn through time and certification criterion for emergency evacuation.
The international yardstick for ARFF response is contained in the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) published by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 14, Section 9.2:

"The most important factors bearing on effective rescue in a survivable accident are: the training [emphasis added] received, the effectiveness of the equipment, and the speed with which personnel and equipment designated for rescue and fire fighting purposes can be put into use."

The United States and Canada fall short of ICAO's recommended ARFF capability, according to Murphy's analysis. As an example, ICAO recommends a maximum response time of 2-3 minutes, while U.S. and Canadian standards allow for 3 minutes, and to the middle of the runway, not to the more demanding challenge of getting to the end of the runway.

An even better example, Murphy maintained, involves the 1996 collision of two aircraft at the intersection of two runways at Quincy, Ill. Fourteen survived the crash of a United Express B1900C and a Beechcraft King Air A90, only to die from smoke and fire. There were two pilots and 10 passengers on the B1900C, and two pilots in the A90. "An unmanned fire truck - required only for aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats - was only a minute away," Murphy recounted. "By the time off-site firefighters arrived, all were dead, having died in clear sight of rescuers who were helpless to do anything."

Raytheon Aircraft Company, parent of Beechcraft, that manufactured both planes in this accident, later petitioned the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), asserting that the prompt presence of ARFF assets would have made no difference in the horrific outcome. The NTSB rejected this argument outright.

The hard lesson out of the Quincy accident is that a marginal approach to ARFF can cost the lives of survivors. Of interest, since 1983 the NTSB has issued 32 recommendations calling for ARFF improvements. Of these, the NTSB has deemed three responses unacceptable.

An ARFF success story. The picture is not entirely bleak. Of several success stories, Murphy believes the very best involves the Aug. 22, 1999, crash of China Airlines Flight CA 642, an MD-11, at Hong Kong's Chek Lap Kok International Airport. With 300 passengers and 15 crew on board, the airplane crashed on landing, broke off a wing, rolled upside down and was on fire, while a monsoon was lashing the airport.

Within one minute of alarm, 14 ARFF vehicles surrounded the wreckage and dealt with the fire. Passengers were stuck, upside down, hanging by their seatbelts. As Murphy recounted, "Although many passengers were burned, some seriously, the fire fighters got all but two out alive, one of whom later died in the hospital."

Are myths impeding progress? The apparent reluctance to invest in more capable ARFF seems to be the byproduct of myths that have taken on the force of conventional wisdom. The myths impede action; the reality should stimulate action, Murphy declared. To make his point, he added a fourth element to the most useless things in aviation:

Altitude above you.
Runway behind you.
Fuel on the ground.
Time/distance between ARFF equipment and your burning aircraft.
What is to be done? Given the problems, we asked Murphy to suggest some actions to mitigate the prevailing minimalist approach. Herewith, his response:

1. Apply ICAO ARFF SARPs as a minimum to all domestic and international flights, down to aircraft with 10 passenger seats, per the NTSB recommendation.

2. Publish information on an airport's ARFF capability, and the record of its ARFF performance, in a manner accessible to the public (i.e., on the Internet).

3. Investigative boards should take a greater interest in ARFF by closely reviewing it whenever an accident or incident occurs at or near the airport. "More detail is required on how ARFF responded," Murphy maintained.

"The accident is not over until all the people are out of the aircraft," he declared. "As with all low probability/high consequence events, we must share information internationally, and learn from each other."

"We will not learn fast enough from ourselves," he concluded. Murphy, tel. 647/290-2689

'Time to Save Lives'
Raytheon petitioned the NTSB to modify its findings in the Quincy crash investigation. One finding dealt with rescue and firefighting. The NTSB, unpersuaded, stuck to its guns:

"The Safety Board concluded that:

'If on-airport aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment protection had been required for this operation at Quincy Airport, lives might have been saved.'

"Raytheon's petition stated that:

'... The presence of such equipment would have been of no assistance to the passengers and co-pilot of the 1900 due to: (1) the intense fire inside the 1900 fuselage, which ignited immediately upon impact, and (2) the large external pool fire. Rescue and fire fighting equipment could not have reached the accident site in time to save these people.'

"The investigation determined that on-airport aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) services would have been able to reach the accident scene in no more than 1 minute (in contrast to the 14-minute response time from the Quincy Fire Department). Thus, ARFF personnel might have been able to extinguish or control the fire, thereby extending the survival time for at least some of the 1900C occupants. Because the impact of the collision did not result in blunt force trauma injuries to the occupants, some might have had time to escape.

"The petitioner's response did not acknowledge the possibility that the captain might have survived if rescue personnel had arrived sooner. As stated previously, the captain was observed by witnesses to have survived for some time (estimated to be 120 seconds), and she was sufficiently coherent to tell potential rescuers to open the door. Also, the AFIP (Armed Forces Institute of Pathology) Assistant Medical Examiner determined the captain 'had a source of fresh air and was partially separated from the main cabin.'

"In addition, the AFIP Assistant Medical Examiner stated that 'since the entire left side of the [1900C] fuselage was intact when the first witnesses arrived approximately 2 minutes after the crash, it seems unlikely that a significant fire had been burning inside the cabin since initial impact.'

"As a result, the Safety Board continues to believe that on-airport ARFF equipment would have reached the accident site in time to save the lives of at least some of those aboard the 1900C. Therefore, the Board has denied the petitioner's request to modify [the] finding."