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Main Article: Karl Laasner procured the IFEN and forced its installation whilst at the same time privately having invested in the company that produced it. By Tim Van Beveren Karl Laasner has worked for Swissair for 38 years.The 56 year old project manager in the marketing department is responsible for the purchase of the IFEN entertainment system which was installed in swissair planes of type MD-11 and Boeing 747. This was a prestigious project for Swissair and it was driven along by Laasner with heart and soul. But now a dark shadow lies over IFEN. But not only because the system was deactivated in all planes after the Halifax accident. The formerly prestigious project has become a big problem for the company. Karl Laasner was not uninvolved in this. This is because Laasner and three other Swissair-employees hold a large amount of stock in the manufacturer of the IFEN - IFT - inflight technologoes, which Laasner reluctantly admitted to FACTS. At this time Sair group was actually already conducting an investigation against him. In the meantime the investigation has been completed. According to the communications director Beatrice Tschantz "no illegal actions in this context" by the airline employees have been proven. There was no case of "insider-trading", which is forbidden in Switzerland, since the purchase of the shares took place after Swissair management had made the decision to purchase the entertainment system April 29, 1996. However: such participation in supplier companies is distasteful. In many companies in Europe and the US such actions are viewed as unethical and therefore are not permitted. Lufthansa (the German airline) for example has fired employees for similar actions. Such procedures are unknown at Swissair.Since then Laasner has confirmed in writing to his employer that on April 30, 1996 He purchased a total of 2700 IFEN shares. Apparently he wanted to benefit from the success of the entertainment system. Too bad for Laasner that the system turned out to be such a flop - least because of the crash of SR111. In the shredded remains of the plane smoldered, burnt cables of the entertainment system have been found. The meaning of their presence has not been explained yet. Irregardless of that, the consequences for the manufacturer of the IFEN have been catastrophic. The share price of IFT hovers around $1. Already last year IFT had announced that they will withdraw from the entertainment-system business. Market analysts foresee not much of a future. Laasner wrote in a August 1999 letter to his employer that he "bought the shares because he was so very convinced of the product and not because speculation". In April 1996 Swissair contracted with IFT to have the systems installed free of charge. The financing was supposed to happen through shared revenue from the videos and gambling on the machines. But the Swissair passengers especially those in the economy-class proved to be tight-wads. Very soon it became clear that the revenues were falling short and that the deal had become unprofitable. Therefore the contractually arranged delivery of the rest of the systems was in danger.Again it was shareholder and Swissair employee Karl Laasner, who in Spring 1997 presented a solution to management: Swissair should change the contract and outrightly purchase the systems for 46 million swiss franks. Management had no options but to agree. The financial risk in case that IFT went bankrupt was too high - not to mention the loss of prestige. Because Swissair never missed a chance to rub in the fact that they had the entertainment systems and that this was a good reason to choose Swissair over other airlines. But Laasner's participation as a shareholder was problematic for other reasons. Due to the SR111 crash, the certification of the IFEN became questionable. It was interesting that the system was certified for installation within a record-breaking 6 months, even though it was manufactured by a company totally unknown in that line of business, installed by Hollingsead International. As "FACTS" was told confidentially by Swissair mechanics, they were not very happy to have strangers do the installation of the system anyway. It broke the heart of some of the mechanics when in the Fall of 1996 the Hollingsead specialists moved into the hangars in Zurich and in January 1997 installed the first system in the MD-11 registration number: HB-IWG. "The whole IFEN circus was suspect to us" said one SR employee, but every time they voiced their reservations Laasner appeared and told them not to worry. It is very interesting that it was always Laasner who assuaged the concerns about IFEN. Soon he got the nickname : "Mr. IFEN". All this happened after Laasner had purchased stock in IFT. Was he trying to influence business for his own enrichment? The fact is that other than Swissair nobody else wanted to purchase entertainment systems from IFT. If the systems had been a huge success for Swissair, possibly other airlines would have been interested in them. And Laasner would have profited handsomely. This had already happened when Swissair announced the deal in 1996. The share-price climbed from $11 to 17. This, Laasner only discovered "significantly later" according to his Statement. Translation of sidebar: Loose ends and sloppiness Forms were missing or filled out incorrectly. The validation of the in-flight entertainment system was done in a questionable way.The installation of the IFEN into the Swissair planes was done in the hangars of the SA subsidiary SR Technics at the time the planes were in for maintenance. At that time things were hectic by Swiss standards in the showcase company. Project manager Adolf Siegenthaler told the "SAirGroup News": The time pressure was enormous. The development of the in-flight entertainment system was not quite completed and right up to the end we were not sure if we'd receive the right parts in time. This statement proves that at the time of the Swissair installation the IFEN was neither completely assembled, tested, nor certified by any regulatory agency.At the basis for the installation and operation of the IFEN was a so-called Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), from the U.S company Santa Barbara Aerospace (SBA) in California. Questionable Certification Santa Barbara Aerospace even issued the document in the place of the FAA, taking the place as it's right arm. This is a normal procedure in the U.S. since the FAA has delegated the certification of such systems to private companies. But taking that into account there are things that make no sense. FACTS magazine had the whole certification process investigated by experts. This investigation brought out the fact that the airworthiness forms were filled out wrong and stated that the "components are not meant for installation in an airplane". A remark which is absurd according to US experts. Because this form would normally only be used to facilitate the installation of components in an airplane. The nearly 900 page file (on the whole subject) is very questionable in other aspects. Some forms are completely missing - e.g. the form which certifies the first properly done installation of an IFEN in a Swissair airplane. Without that form Santa Barbara Aerospace should not even have issued the certificate. They did it anyway.Checks only after crash.This document, which carried the official stamp of the FAA was enough for the Swiss Federal Office of Civilian Aviation (Bazl) to allow the operation of the IFEN. The Bazl-office certified the legitimacy and legality of the document without checking the process at all. The basis for the STC certificate was not interesting to anybody until after the crash of SR111. In the course of the investigation of the crash, the Swiss Bazl office awoke from its slumber. On November 13, 1998 they revoked the validation of the certificate. On October 28 Swissair already turned off the IFEN and disconnected the cables. Since then the Bazl office has stated that in the future such validations "will be looked at more closely". | |||
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Other translated Swiss articles regarding IFEN: Did swissair pressure BAZL?????? Source : NLZ-F; Neue Luzerner Zeitung (Swissnewspaper)Publication Date : 24 November 1998;Language :German Author : Unknown Translation Date : 30 January2000 Swissair: Administrative investigation in the BAZL Still high focus on entertainment system Swissair should have exercised pressure on the BAZL to get the entertainment system in its aircraft installed. Swissair ChiefPhilippe Bruggisser denied this reproach. Nevertheless,federal counselor Moritz Leuenberger ordered an administrative investigation in the BAZL. Yesterday,SAirGroup Chief Philippe Bruggisser stated at a press conference in Glattbrugg ZH that the acquisition, installation and operation of the on board entertainment systemin MD-11 and jumbo jets had been certificated by the US authorities FAA on 24 January 1997. The BAZL validated the certification. The system of the company In Flight Technologies was built into the accident aircraft in the period from 21 August up to and including 11 September 1997. "Swissair never flew its aircraft with activated system without certification,"exclaimed the SAirGroup Chief. Bruggisser also said that the BAZL informed Swissair on 13 November that it had withdrawn the certificate�s validity. Swissair had deactivated the system on 28 October for precautionary reasons. Of late there have been speculations that the wiring could be related to the accident in the night of 3 September, causing the death of 229 people. Right or wrong? Bruggisser decisively declined that Swissair exercised pressure on the BAZL in regard to the on board entertainment system. "Wrong information," according to Bruggisser. In contradiction to this, BAZL spokesman Hans Aebersold in an interview in the SFDRS program �10 vor 10� had said that Swissair had commenced with the installation prior to the presentation of the official US certificate; and that the BAZL because of Swissair�s pressure issued a time limited,provisional certificate. the US certification was received after the system had been installed in seven aircraft. Aebersold declared yesterday, however, that all had been handled correctly. Federal counselor Moritz Leuenberger ordered an administrative inquiry in the BAZL yesterday. The inquiry deals with the reproach that Swissair should have exercised pressure. Basically, it concerns the clarification ofthe procedures in regard to the introduction of the on board entertainment system in Swissair aircraft.\\\ Source : NZZ-F; Neue Z�rcher Zeitung (Swissnewspaper)Publication Date : 24 November 1998 Language :German Author : M. Baumann Translation Date : 30 January2000 Correct certification of entertainment system Swissair�s management about the rumors in the Sunday press Philippe Bruggisser, SAirGroup�s chief, has responded to various rumors in the Sunday press, at a press conference in Glattbrugg. First of all, the cause of the Swissair aircraft type MD-11 accident near the coast of Eastern Canada, is still unclear. The only thing that is factualon basis of the most recent explorations is that the cockpit separation shield indicated traces of heat. If there is any relationship between this and the Inflight Entertainment System�s wires that are routed there, is nothing more than just one of the many other possibilities.Until now, the Canadian investigators have not identified the system as being the cause of the accident.Bruggisser exclaimed further that the acquisition,installation, operation and certification of the publicly criticized on board entertainment system in the First and Business Class had been correctly conducted. The American aviation authorities (FAA) as well as later the BAZL had accepted and certified the system. Santa Barbara Aerospace had certified the system as ordered by the FAA; Swissair was in the possession of the corresponding documents on 24 January 1996. The BAZL then customarily took over the<br>certification. Bruggisser stated that the BAZL did not have the experts to verify suchcomplex systems. Because of this the FAA certificates were accepted. There was never a Swissair aircraft in the air without certification. Opposite statements by BAZL employees quoted by the ŒSonntags-Zeitung�, Swissair neither excercised any pressure on the BAZL in order to obtain a provisional certificateas quickly as possible. According to Bruggisser,this must be classified as false information. After the arrival of the certificate for the entertainment system, a test flight was conducted that very same day. After this point the system was activated on a commercial flight. As a precautionary measure after SR 111 crash, Swissair deactivated the system on 28 October (1998) until further notice.Bruggisser is still convinced that the entertainment system on Swissair aircraft is still the best in the market. When it would be determined that the system has nothing to do with the crash, Swissair will keep on to it, and operate the entertainment system after new certification on the MD-11 fleet and on three jumbo jets. _______________________________________________ (I don't think so considering the FAA no longer allows this system on any aircraft). Remember Mr. Bruggisser was the CEO when the Enron-like scandal occurred to swissair which resulted in the airline going out of business. | ||||
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Here is one other article by van Beveren regarding the IFEN. Strange- I thought I had another that he wrote earlier but I couldn't find it unfortunately. As you can see from this one (and I believe his most recent) the FAA is no longer (though they did along with SBA approve the IFEN)allowing this kind of system aboard aircraft today particularly the way it was installed. MD-11: A System Shutdown The American FAA requires the re-development of on-board systems with a dangerous deficiency By TIM VAN BEVEREN Washington/Zurich Two and a half years after the crash of the Swissair 111 MD-11, the disputed on-board inflight entertainment systems (IFEN) are to be withdrawn from service. The American air regulatory authority (the FAA) will issue 14 obligatory safety directives, their so-called AD Notices, in the next few weeks. They are obligatory on all US airlines, in addition, on foreign airlines, which operate flights to the USA. New investigations resulted in a finding that add-on IFEN systems contain dangerous faults, in particular in Boeings of the type 737, 747, 757, 767, DC-9, MD-83, DC-10 as well as the Airbus A340. The FAA requires that the aircraft be modified within 18 months - or the systems are to be completely shut down. This FAA operation is a damage limitation exercise- and in its own interests. In the future an IFEN system must be able to be switched off locally, without requiring access to a remotely located (and hard to identify) cockpit circuit-breaker. No longer permitted are any installations in which a maintenance system can only be powered down by pulling the electrical circuit-breakers, as was the case with the downed Swissair 111 jet. The authority claims " that this measure is not connected to the continuing TSB (of Canada) investigation into the Swissair 111 accident". American flight safety experts are of a contrary opinion. The FAA is evidently in damage limitation mode in view of its own, dubious role during the certification of that infamous on-board inflight entertainments and gambling system. It had been built into the SR111 accident airplane as a hasty add-on customer "draw-card". Obviously the FAA wants to get in ahead of an anticipated identical safety recommendation by the Canadian accident authority (the TSB) for "image" reasons. Swissair had already voluntarily shut down the maintenance systems on its MD 11 and Boeing-747 Fleets after the 2 September 1998 accident. In November of the same year, the Swiss Federal Office for civil aviation (BAZL) withdrew the operating permit from the system (its Supplementary Type Certificate - or STC). During the accident investigation, Canadian specialists had discovered, in the wreckage, sections of the IFEN system's cabling which indicated electrical arc-tracking had occurred. To what extent this phenomenon may have "caused" the tragic crash off the coast of Halifax is not yet completely clear. The firm that manufactured the IFEN system built into Flight 111, the American enterprise known as Inflight Technologies (or IFT), no longer exists. The IFEN system itself is nevertheless still in use; it is now to be installed in British express trains. | ||||
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Here were Patrick Price's words concerning the IFEN: Wed Sep 29, 1999 6:50 pm Subject: Patrick Price's remarks/IFEN The FAA is up to it's OLD TRICKS. Appearing to be acting to what happened on SR 111 they are saying to the world, we have recognized that the IFEN system should NOT be installed on any US registered airplanes. But someone in the FAA signed off the STC to allow it to be used on SR111. Someone, who did NOT check out the power requirements against the MD-11 design requirements. Did NOT check out the airplane drawings to see how the wiring would be installed and where it could be connected to a power source to insure the safety of the system. Boeing engineering went on record as saying that they would NOT have allowed the installation of the IFEN system. So who in the FAA are the wheels going to take action against for allowing the STC to be signed off? As I have said previously, after seeing the workmanship of the wire installation, it appeared to have been installed in a HURRY (sloppy workmanship). The FAA acknowledges that the system was NOT installed on any US airplanes. But since the FAA did sign off the STC, then they are just as guilty and the company that installed it and the airline that applied pressure to hurry up the installation. Boeing wasn't any party to the IFEN system being installed but they owning (MD and all the MD-11s) and had previous knowledge of the dangers of KAPTON wire must take part responsibility for the crash. Isn't it ironic that MD was in the process of changing the wiring from KAPTON to TKT on the last few MD-11s, and yet Boeing insists on NOT using TKT wire on many of their models. Patrick | ||||
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Stephen Thorne of the Canadian Press: STEPHEN THORNE OTTAWA (CP) - The world's top aviation regulator has banned the use of an inflight entertainment system that may be implicated in last year's crash of Swissair Flight 111 off the Nova Scotia coast. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration said the system, already disconnected on Swissair planes and not used anywhere else, is "not compatible with the design concept of the MD-11 airplane." All 229 aboard the Swissair MD-11 were killed Sept. 2, 1998 after its captain reported cockpit smoke, then crashed off Peggy's Cove, N.S. Lack of immediate crew control over power to the system, built by U.S.-based Interactive Flight Technologies, "limits the flight crew's ability to respond to a smoke or fumes emergency," the FAA said in an airworthiness directive Wednesday. The agency, whose dictums are usually followed industry-wide, said such emergencies demand removal of electrical power from all non-essential systems in the passenger cabin, including the inflight entertainment system. "Although the electrical power for the system would eventually be removed as the flight crew proceeds down the checklist, the installation could be confusing and could possibly cause a delay in identifying the source of smoke or fumes." Pulling the entertainment system's circuit breakers is the only way to cut electrical power to it, the FAA noted. The system was installed under the authority of an FAA approval known as a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) issued by Santa Barbara Aerospace, a former FAA-sanctioned representative that has since gone out of business. The Swissair crash and a subsequent FAA investigation of its own procedures highlighted a major flaw in the approvals process, a source said. "They have been doing a rather extensive review of their system of issuing STCs and they found a problem," said the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "They're in the process of doing something about it." Canadian investigators found arced and burned wiring from both the inflight entertainment system and the jet's general electrical systems. They are currently testing the wires to determine whether they burned from the outside in or inside out, which will indicate whether they were the source of the fire that brought down Flight 111. Inspections based on information from the Canadian investigation showed damaged and poorly installed wires aboard at least a dozen other MD-11s and spawned several other airworthiness directives from the FAA. The Swissair system offered high-paying passengers video on demand, as well as gambling and video games. At least two other airlines, Alitalia and Qantas, tested the system and deemed it unsuitable. "There have never been any U.S.-registered airplanes that had this particular inflight entertainment network installed," said FAA spokesman Les Dorr. "This is a pre-emptive move on our part." Dorr said authorities reviewed the service history of many of the world's fleet of about 178 MD-11s and further inspected Swissair's fleet. Wiring "discrepancies" were found, he added. "It's a culmination of everything that's come out of the investigation so far," he said. "You cannot infer that this in any way targets this inflight entertainment network as contributing to the accident. We simply don't know." Swissair bought the system after at least one of its senior officials bought shares in the company that built it. The $80-million US deal came shortly after Karl Laasner, the Swissair official in charge of the project, bought 2,700 shares in Interactive Flight Technologies for $30,000 US in April 1996. During the next few months the value of the company more than doubled to $120 million US amid speculation that Australia's Qantas would follow Swissair's lead and install the system on its 48 long-haul jets. Swissair confirmed Laasner's share transactions, first reported in a Swiss magazine article, but said it concluded after an internal investigation that he had not broken any rules. IFT lost $51 million in 1997 as Qantas and other airlines cancelled orders. Court documents obtained by The Canadian Press also suggest a longstanding relationship between Swissair's CEO Jeffrey Katz and the head of IFT, Thomas Meltzer. Both men worked for American Airlines in the Dallas area in the early- to mid-1990s. Since the crash, IFT sued Swissair, contending it had relied on Swissair's maintenance arm, SR Technics, to ensure the system was properly integrated with Swissair's MD-11s. Swissair in turn sued IFT, Santa Barbara Aerospace, and Hollingshead International, the U.S. company that installed the system. | ||||
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I finally found the other FACTS article written by Tim van Beveren: This is an article that appeared in FACTS in '98. RISKY CABLING Facts magazine, 1998 month unknown By Von Tim van Beveren investigation of the crash of SR 111 the entertainment system takes center stage. Was Swissair careless?The two gentlemen were curious and persistent. At the end of last week the Swissair headquarters in Zuerich was visited by the Canadian aviation-accident-investigators from the TSB. (Transportation Safety Board) The interest of the airplane detectives focused on the sister-ships of the Swissair MD-11, which had crashed 2 months previously. The Canadian investigators looked very closely at a particular bundle of cables required for the operation of the Inflight Entertainment System (IFEN) in the Business- and First Class. Behind the acronym IFEN hides the modern on-board- entertainment-system for the MD-11 and the Boeing-747 fleet, which was purchased by Swissair in April 1996 for 46 million Swiss Francs. It showed movies and served as console for gambling (patrons would have to pay for the gambling). The information thus far released by the Canadian investigators is plenty of reason to worry. The experts were baffled that the system was connected directly into the AC Bus No. 2, the main power supply of the plane. The power cable recovered from the Swissair 111 wreck ran from the cockpit to the passenger cabin underneath the ceiling cover. This cable (from the crashed Swissair plane), which consisted of 4 separate, isolated wires, showed signs “of extreme heat and fire” according to the Canadian TSB. Additionally, the investigators found traces of molten plastic on the seat cover of the rear seat in the cockpit. A connection of the crash with the IFEN is becoming ever more likely. The entertainment system, once in operation proved to be an extremely greedy user of electricity. Underneath each seat is a computer with a Pentium processor, installed to control the interactive gambling. The Australian airline Quantas had also been interested in the IFEN system, but declined to purchase due to the high consumption of electricity and the ensuing production of heat.The last transmissions from the doomed MD-11 on the Canadian coastline proved that heat and smoke played a role in the crash of the plane. Therefore the investigators are now searching for mostly for the trigger of a possible cable fire. The manufacturer of the IFEN, a company named Interactive Flight Technologies based in Arizona, declines comment on newest developments. Last week the company announced surprisingly that they will give up the entertainment system business. For Swissair the entertainment system gradually developed into a fiasco. The Swiss were the only buyers for the system in the world and it did not even fulfill commercial expectations. Now it has been disconnected in all planes for safety reasons. The fact that the IFEN was connected to the main power of the Swissair planes also caused concerns with the plane’s manufacturer, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. Normally on-board-entertainment systems are connected from the factory to a secondary power supply, which in turn is responsible only for the power supply of very secondary or non-essential systems. In the case of a malfunction, this can be turned off right away. This shutting off of secondary systems was also the first item on the checklist of SR111, which captain Urs Zimmerman and co-pilot Stephan L�w followed in that fateful night. Except for the ”little blemish” that the entertainment system was not connected to a secondary system and therefore could not be shut off with the first prescribed switch. It continued to be connected to the main power bus, which supplied all important systems of the plane with power. The cable isolation material used in the installation for the IFEN also stirs the curiosity of the American experts. Tefzel, a teflon compound mixed with polyethylene (type MIL 22759-16-12) is used only in civil planes. It was invented for the Air Force fighter F-5, but already discontinued by it’s manufacturer, Gruman 1982. The reason: Gruman was concerned about toxic fumes in case of fire. Furthermore it showed a heat resistance of only approximately 150 degrees Celsius (approx. 330 Farenheit). Other open questions make it clear that Swissair deviated from their normally so pedantic testing procedures in the case of the launch of the hi-tech prestige object. Each component which is installed in a passenger aircraft has to be approved for that purpose. And each subsequent later change needs to be approved by the appropriate oversight agency – in the case of the MD-11 and Boeing-747 a certification by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration).Swissair testified in FACTS magazine that such a certification had been done according to all the rules. Indeed a so called Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) with registration number ST 00236LA-D exists. However, the certificate is not issued to Swissair, but to Santa Barbara Aerospace Incorporated in California. It was signed by the coordinator for certification issues within a Californian company, whose task it is to execute the certification of such systems for and in the name of the FAA. In the relevant documents another Californian company, Hollingsead International, received permission to install such Systems in MD-11 airplanes.A strange manner of operation indeed: Company A issues itself a certificate so that company B can install a system manufactured by company C into the planes of company D. Why all that roundabout operation? Why did Hollingsead not certify the installation themselves? And what was the role of the Swiss Federal Office for Civilian Aviation (Bazl)? Were compromises in safety made in the installation of the IFEN? Swissair always maintained that they had nothing to do with the Installation of the entertainment system. This is only partially true. On the Swissair Bulletin Board of April 14, 1997, it says that “during to maintenance related downtimes SR technics would prepare the cabling in the Y-class of the plane as far as possible. It is also documented that work proceeded under extreme time pressure. The responsible project manager at the time, a Adolf Siegenthaler wrote in the SAirGroup News of January 1997, that “the time pressure was enormous. The Inflight-Entertainment- System was not even fully developed and we were not sure right up to the end if we would receive all required parts in time. At the same time 55 employees of the American company, which was to install the system were standing around in our hangars and wanted to get to work on the planes, right at the same time as our mechanics were trying to do the required maintenance of the planes.” Swissair permitted another risky practice when the after-market installation of the entertainment system created an additional danger source: the concurrent use of different isolation materials. It has been known already since the end of the 1970s that different isolation materials should not be mixed in airplane manufacturing. The mixing of materials results especially in the case of Swissair –in the usage of cabling made of Kapton along with other isolation materials lead to the chafing of the softer material Tefzel (used by Swissair). This is confirmed by the American expert Edward Block. In the mid 1980s, Block had problems when he investigated the use of Kapton cabling in fighter jest type F-14, which he investigated as an expert for the Department of Defense. “The mixture of such very different isolation materials enables the much rougher Kapton to act like sandpaper on the softer Tefzel. This can be observed in very soft vibrations, which happen in airplanes all the time. At some point the isolation of the softer cable is damaged or may even lie completely open. A small spark is enough to then cause an inferno.”It is even more perplexing that Swissair allowed the Entertainment system to be connected to the main power bus and with the use of a different cabling type then was used in the plane otherwise. It is also disturbing that the maintenance companies and the airline could issue a certificate of safety for aviation in the name of a national aviation governmental agency. This is a direct result of a well intentioned elimination of bureaucracy both in the US and in Europe. The governmental agencies are severely understaffed and therefore delegate such time sensitive investigations to third parties. In many cases this leads this leads to a definite conflict of interest, as mechanics who are installing a system certify it at the same time. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the governmental agencies almost never have experts in these matters on staff. Such experts are more likely to work for the airlines or the manufacturers of such systems – especially since the pay is much better.Normally especially the smaller governmental agencies rely on the “exemplary” agency, the FAA – as is the case with the Swiss Bazl. The Bazl is only informed about such certifications as the one for the Inflight Entertainment System and accepts them without questions. However, in the United States, the FAA is in the crossfire of criticism, especially since the advent of discussions about airplane cabling. Thomas McSweeny, the FAA director responsible for Certification issues said recently in a TV program: “Cable is cable. We don’t have a problem.” | ||||
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