President George Bush

Dear Sir,

I am preparing the following article to be posted on my web site this week. It is to inform the American and Foreign public how the US government is handling AIR SAFETY that lets it's military personnel, civilian passengers and flight crews be exposed to air disasters that could have been prevented. It is well documented with government papers, government statements, foreign accident reports and media statement of FACTS.

OVERSIGHT as practiced by the FAA:
1. FAA Special Technical Audit of Boeing, December 1, 1999 through February 11, 2000 found "in some cases processes were not sufficient to ensure compliance to applicable regulations, processes were not followed, or substantion of compliance was unclear. As a result, some parts have been released that do not comply with the applicable regulations. Manufacturing planning was not adequate, requirements were not followed, inspections were not sufficient, or personnel were not knowledgeable of the requirements. As a result, parts, assemblies, and installations are through the system that do not conform to the type design."
2. The Boeing Company agrees to $61.5 million dollars over faulty gears installed on Army helicopters as reported by the AP on August 4, 2000. Military personnel put at RISK!
3. FAA faulted for inspection lapses: reported by Stephen Power and Andy Pasztor of the THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Boeing faces fines of $764,250.
FAA proposes stiff penalty for use of substandard adhesive, other lapses. Reported by By JAMES WALLACE: jameswallace@seattlepi.com
The proposed fine of $764,250 covers not only the use of the adhesive, but also Boeing's failure to maintain an adequate quality-control system in building jetliners and overseeing the work of suppliers. The problems, which included faulty parts being installed on airplanes, were uncovered during a special audit of Boeing's jetliner manufacturing in late 1999 and early 2000.

Now compare $764,250 FAA in fines to a Boeing settlement of $61.5 million dollars for installing FAULTY GEARS in military helicopters. Is this adequate OVERSIGHT punishment for putting military personnel, civilian passengers and flight crews at risk when it involves failure to maintain an adequate quality-control system?

I am asking you as a US concerned citizen to have the Justice Department or GAO investigate this matter to prevent more deaths and to show those previously killed in air disasters, that they did not die in vain because of greed, public corruption, criminal activities and lies.

Sincerely,

Patrick A. Price
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~**********~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

DAILY COST OF DOING BUSINESS!

MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR PASSENGERS & FLIGHT CREWS
DIE PLAYING 'RUSSIAN ROULETTE' - SO WHAT'S NEW?

One has to consider the TEAM players. Not just the DoT/FAA, but the air manufacturers, NTSB, insurance carriers, airline companies and travel agents. Apparently they have come to an agreement that they can live with the figure of $2.7 million, each time an airliner crashes, and let attorneys reduce this amount in settlements. The DoT/FAA will use their COST - BENEFIT formula of $2.7 million to represent each DEAD passenger and flight crew member to establish whether they have to issue an Airworthiness Directive that will cost the Air Industry many dollars to correct.

What does the Federal Regulation FAR 25 state? Current URL is:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/cfrhtml_00/Title_14/14cfr25_00.html which states:

"25.601 General. The airplane may not have design features or details that experience has shown to be hazardous or unreliable. The suitability of each questionable design detail and part must be established by tests."
"25.603 Materials. The suitability and durability of materials used for parts, the failure of which could adversely affect safety, must -- (a) Be established on the basis of experience or tests;"

Based on paragraphs 25.601 and 25.603 regulations, the DoT/FAA has the tool to prevent DEFECTIVE DESIGNED AIRCRAFT WIRE from being installed on commercial airliners. But what is the current policy of DoT/FAA regarding aircraft wire?

*** A FAA Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) letter to the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), "as stated earlier, the FAA does not become directly involved in engineering new wire insulation or construction types and therefore does not have a need to analyze the quantum physics of aromatic polyimide (Kapton) or irradiated fleuropolymer materials. As with other aspects of certification, the TAD relies heavily upon other sources for information, and frequently assistance. At hand, the FAA has tremendous resources available, when one considers the FAA’s ability to augment its technical staff with members of academia and industry.

The FAA has, for instance, Designated Engineering Representatives appointed by the Administrator. These DER’s are employed by the manufacturers but are designated to perform certification functions for the FAA. The expertise in the FAA certification organization lies in establishing requirements and ensuring that aircraft designs meet those standards. We do not mandate the manner in which the certification criteria are met.

The Flight Standards organization function is more closely directed at inspection of the fleet. It is difficult to determine the number of experts available, but there are approximately 16 to 18 engineers in the certification Directorates and Aircraft Certification Offices, 4 at the Technical Center, and perhaps 25 or more at the manufacturers. There are also many specialists in the FSDO’s, with each office having avionics inspectors monitoring the airlines’ maintenance programs."

*** "Conclusion: We are always open to constructive inputs from the public. We have sought to answer the commentator’s questions as fully as possible and trust this response will satisfy both the General Accounting Office and the questioner that the FAA is, and will remain, as with all aspects of commercial aircraft operation, cognizant and responsible with regard to aircraft electrical wiring.

Should you wish to discuss this matter further, the engineer on my staff most familiar with this subject is Mr. John Dimtroff. He can be reached at (205) 227-2117.

Sincerely,

Ronald T. Wojnar
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate
Aircraft Certification Service"

Do you believe the DoT/FAA when they say that they are cognizant and responsible with regard to aircraft electrical wiring? The DoT/FAA hides behind FAR 25 and is the government's AIR SAFETY ADVOCATE, but states that "the FAA does not become directly involved in engineering new wire insulation or construction types and therefore does not have a need to analyze the quantum physics of aromatic polyimide or irradiated fleuropolymer materials." This is speaking out of both sides of the DoT/FAA's mouth.

*** Our data specialist, John King, jking1@attbi.com searching government data bases, has found and copied OVER 400+ incidents/accidents involving aircraft wire. I believe this qualifies for 'actual experience' in determining that 'DEFECTIVE DESIGNED AIRCRAFT WIRE' has been installed on many aircraft.

1. Boeing has sold their customers on designed aircraft wire that meets regulations set by the National Electrical Manufacturers. That means the wire meets wire specified for general 'HOUSE CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS.' Is this the kind of aircraft wire you want on your aircraft, house wire?
2. The DoT/FAA will NOT revise the FAR 25 Regulation to call for; electrical arc tracking of aircraft wire or insulation blanket material.
3. The NTSB refuses to recommend to the FAA to revise FAR 25 to call for 'electrical arc tracking' of aircraft wiring and insulation materials that were ignited on the SR 111 disaster and many other accidents.
4. The year 2001, the FAA proposed a rule change to FAR 25, docket number FAA-2001-9633, "to incorporate JAR-25 (Joint Aviation Requirements of the European countries) under the Harmonization Program. This proposal brings the European countries into a World Wide Agreement regarding commercial aircraft design for SAFETY REGULATIONS. In Europe, the airworthiness standards for type certification of transport category airplanes are contained in Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR)-25, which are based on FAR 25. These were developed by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe to provide a common set of airworthiness standards within the European aviation community. Twenty-three European countries accept airplanes type certified to the JAR-25 standards, including airplanes manufactured in the U.S. that are type certified to JAR-25 standards for export to Europe."

*** The issue of IN-FLIGHT FIRE IGNITION was completely ignored because it appears to be a DAILY COST OF DOING BUSINESS for the Air Industry and disregard air safety?

*** Another term used by the Air Industry, which is a SOCIALLY ENGINEERED TERM for the CAUSE of an air disaster is, 'MECHANICAL MALFUNCTION.' This is used to camouflage any air disasters caused by Electrical wiring malfunctions like SR 111, VJ 592, UAL 811 and many others so that the public and flight crews will NOT look at most aircraft wiring as dangerous. Don't let the public know the truth!

5. Additional proof that the TEAM members; Boeing, DoT/FAA, JAA, NTSB, Airlines and Insurance carriers knew the dangers of certain TYPES of aircraft wire. The FAA and NTSB were made aware of the dangers of Kapton wire being an "IGNITER" of (metalized mylar insulation blankets) when hit with an ELECTRICAL ARC TRACKING FLASHOVER. As investigative team members, the FAA/NTSB were called in on the MD-87 accident on 24 November 1993 at the Copenhagen Airport KASTRUP (EKCH). They became aware of how devastating an "electrical arc tracking fire" could be in igniting insulation blankets by just Two KAPTON wires. I have a copy of the AAIB DENM REPORT 2/96. The NTSB, as well as members from McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing), SAS Company CIT, (AAIB) Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and the FAA, were called in to investigate this accident.

“Page two of the report states:
2. "The pinching resulted in chafing of the wire insulation, which again led to metal to metal contact between the wires and aircraft structure and wire to wire contact." (This is called [DRY] ARC TRACKING.) "Continued arcing and sparking resulted in "IGNITION of the cabin SIDEWALL INSULATION material which eventually developed into a FIERCE, for the crew an uncontrollable fire which subsequently DESTROYED the aft part of the cabin interior and a MAJOR part of the aircraft structure."

“Page 15 of the AAIB report:
1.7.8
"McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) Alert Service Bulletin A24-132 dated 15 January 1992, AD note 92-NM-43-AD amendment 39-8364, AD92-16-06 and the SAS MTO-240407D, which dictates that after initial inspection (ref. KTO-240408) modify right-hand side galley power feeder wire assembly push-mounts installation, were complied with. This particular modification related to the load distribution of the right-hand, side galley power feeder wire assembly push-mount installation and called for replacing the existing push-mounts with new tie-mounts and sta-straps. The reason for the TO was: that one operator reported one instance of smoke in the cabin coming from the ceiling panel attachments. LOCATING and SECURING of MIGRATING WIRES that could present a POTENTIAL RISK of CHAFING and ARCING was the PURPOSE of the T.O."
"Page 23 of the AAIB report:
1.19.1 Fire tests
"The NTSB conducted an analysis of the arced and fused wire ends, and SAS electrical engineering department conducted a circuit breaker trip test." "The NTSB conducted an analysis of the arced and fused wire ends, and SAS electrical engineering department conducted a circuit breaker trip test."

*** 1.19.1.1 Electrical arc testing
"FAA Test Centre, Fire Safety Branch also conducted tests to prove that the scenario of ignition and sustainable fire could in fact take place. The tests were conducted in part of a fuselage shell. One 20 American Wire Gauge (AWG) with Kapton insulation was connected to a 28 volt power source and one 20 AWG Kapton insulated wire connected to a 208/115 volt - 400 cycle - 3 phase power supply. . . . . each test until such intense arcing developed that the (polyester film) on the batting material ignited. The fire was self-sustaining and had to be extinguished with a hand held fire extinguisher. Results of the various tests conducted by the FAA are enclosed as appendix D.”
“Page 31 of the AAIB report:
2.3.3 Follow-up of inspection of three other MD-87s
"As stated in this report, the investigation revealed clearly that the primary ignition source was that two wires, carrying an electrical load of 28 volt AC and 115 volt AC respectively, became pinched between the aircraft structure and the recirculation fan duct installed on the partition at FS1095."

*** “Page 35 of the AAIB report:
2.3.8 Tests conducted by NTSB and FAA
"The results of the tests were positive in as much as the majority of conclusions coincided with the conclusions found during the investigation."

6. Boeing's CEO of the Commercial Division, Mr. Mulally, was recently quoted in the Seattle P-I, "We have rededicated ourselves to our fundamental roots," Mulally said, "and that is to provide airplanes and services that further improve the safety and efficiency of the global air transportation system."

I asked him two questions regarding Air Safety which were:
a. Do you feel that airplane safety is improved by NOT studying different types
of aircraft wire?
b. Would airplane safety be improved by the FAA revising FAR 25, to call for
electrical arc tracking of aircraft wire, and insulation blanket material?

He has failed to answer my questions. Probably because Boeing members of his staff, used Boeing influence on the DoT/FAA ATSRAC Committee, to prevent the Committee from recommending a WORK STUDY PROJECT on DIFFERENT TYPES of AIRCRAFT WIRE!

*** The basic aircraft wire problem is the DESIGN and CONSTRUCTION of the insulation material. Does it become a FUEL for an electrical flashover fire or NOT a FUEL. The requirement for arc track testing (ignition source) of in-flight fires would eliminate defective wire insulation materials from being designed for installation in commercial airliners. This would be accomplished by revising FAR 25 to call out for arc track testing of aircraft wire and insulation blanket material.

*** I gave this proposal to the DoT/FAA ATSRAC Committee since the DoT/FAA is on record that "we are always open to constructive inputs from the public" and the NTSB to recommend this proposal to the DoT/FAA.

All I received was STONEWALLING, ROAD BLOCKS or no replies. I therefore am asking for your assistance to make Air Travel safer, Mr. President and hold the DoT/FAA and the Air Industry accountable for the hundreds of deaths of passengers, military personnel and flight crews. I would suggest that you and your staff see the VIDEO TAPE of the BBC Panorama's program of "DIE BY WIRE" which is based on the dangers of the aircraft wire 'KAPTON' which caused SR 111 to crash.

My qualifications are posted on my web site at http://members.aol.com/papcecst/

Patrick A. Price
Air Safety Crusader
05/03/2002