Pilot Union: Airbus knew of A300 crash risk.
Dallas Morning News


WASHINGTON – An internal memorandum shows that Airbus knew the tail on its A300-600 jetliner was subject to failure more than four years before an American Airlines flight lost its tail and crashed in New York in 2001, an official with the airline's pilots union said Monday.
The Airbus memo, which union officials said they obtained from crash-related court files, states that movement of the A300-600's rudder back and forth could create stresses far beyond what the plane's tail was designed to tolerate – a critical point that manufacturers call "ultimate load." The memo was written in June 1997 by Thomas Thurnagel, an Airbus engineer in Germany.

"People died because this memo wasn't disclosed, in my opinion," said John David, deputy safety chairman for the Allied Pilots Association.

Airbus, which has overtaken Boeing as the world's dominant commercial aircraft manufacturer, denied the allegation. Airbus spokesman David Venz accused the union of "shopping" the document to the media.

The memo's release and the Airbus response represent the latest volleys in a war of words between the manufacturer and American. It comes two weeks before the National Transportation Safety Board is to issue its findings on the crash of American Flight 587 on Nov. 12, 2001. Two hundred and sixty-five people were killed when the aircraft plunged into a Queens neighborhood shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport.

NTSB officials couldn't be reached for comment Monday, a federal holiday.

American Airlines spokesman Bruce Hicks said the carrier couldn't comment on the memo because of court-imposed restrictions. But he said the airline had been "concerned for a long time about how much Airbus knew and never properly disclosed."


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Airbus has consistently maintained that it wasn't aware of any potentially catastrophic design flaw with the A300-600 before the crash. Instead, it has blamed mistakes by pilot Sten Molin for the mistakes.

The New York Times reported last month that the safety board "is poised to conclude that actions by [Mr. Molin] were the main cause" of the Flight 587 crash.

Mr. David, however, said that if Airbus had alerted A300-600 operators or the safety board to the potential rudder problems, the crash might have been prevented.

The plane's tail snapped off 103 seconds into a flight from JFK to the Dominican Republic.

Airbus maintains Mr. Molin caused the accident by using the rudder too aggressively to steady the plane after encountering turbulence. It says it warned American of "dangerous use of rudder and the fact that such use could result in loss of controlled flight or damage to aircraft structures."

Mr. Thurnagel's memo summarizes Airbus' investigation into the near crash of an A300-600 on approach to Miami in May 1997. The pilot lost control of American Airlines Flight 903 at 16,000 feet and moved the rudder from side to side to recover, almost tearing off the tail in the process. "Rudder movement from left limit to right limit will produce loads on fin/rear fuselage above ultimate design load," the memo says.

Had this problem been disclosed, Mr. David said, pilots of the A300-600 could have been cautioned about use of the rudder; he described the rudder control as being "unusually sensitive" to foot pressure. The NTSB didn't issue such a warning until after Flight 587 was lost.

http://media.fastclick.net/w/click.here?cid=20772&mid=46657&sid=1098&m=1&c=0&forced_click=http://c.casalemedia.com/c?s=54566&f=3&id=0

NTSB set to rule on American Flight 587 crash cause.
AP


The vertical stabilizer from American Airlines flight 587 is hoisted from Jamaica Bay, New York in this 2001 photo. (File Photo)
WASHINGTON (AP) -- If the pilot flying American Airlines Flight 587 had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the jetliner's tail wouldn't have broken off, the plane wouldn't have plunged into a New York City neighborhood and 265 people wouldn't have died on Nov. 12, 2001.
On those details, the investigators agree.

But the pilot didn't know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn't -- and who's to blame for that -- is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus Industrie, which made the plane, and American Airlines, which trained the pilot.

That dispute is expected to play out in public Tuesday when the National Transportation Safety Board meets to discuss its findings.

Flight 587 had just taken off from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport for the Dominican Republic when it encountered heavy turbulence caused by a large plane that took off before it.

Sten Molin, the co-pilot who was flying the Airbus A300-600 tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane's tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail and it broke off.

The plane crashed into a Queens neighborhood, killing all 260 aboard and five people on the ground. It was the second-deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.

AMR Corp.'s American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims the manufacturer didn't alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.

"Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue," American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.


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Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.

An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.

For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.

Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline's then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.

"I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous," Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane's rolling motion.

Paul Railsback, American's managing director of flight operations, testified in an April 8, 2003, deposition that he warned airline executives that someone would be killed some day as a result of the training.

Hicks countered that Airbus didn't share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.

Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances "can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight," and, in others, could break off the tail.

Hicks said Airbus' comments didn't specifically say that the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.

Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and it was replaced.

John David, a spokesman for American Airlines' pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn't properly communicate what it knew.

American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation.

http://www.airdisaster.com/news/1004/26/news.shtml

Pilot blamed for air crash


THE co-pilot of a plane which crashed in New York in November 2001 made a fatal error when using the aircraft's rudder, US investigators have found.

American Airlines Flight 587 lost its tail and plummeted into the Queens area of New York, killing 265 people and sparking fears of another terror attack soon after 9/11.

The National Transportation Safety Board said an overly sensitive rudder system on the Airbus A300-600 and inadequate pilot training by American were also contributing factors.

http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1243102004

AA co-pilot blamed in crash
A safety agency said Tuesday that the co-pilot of American Airlines Flight 587 caused the November 2001 crash that killed all 265 people on board, according to news reports Tuesday.


National Transportation Safety Board investigator Robert Benzon said the copilot's response to turbulence in the seconds after the Airbus A300-600 plane took flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York was "unnecessary and aggressive."

Benzon also said American Airlines, a unit of AMR Corp. (NYSE: AMR), did not properly train pilots to use the aircraft's rudder when recovering from flight disturbances.

Airbus is owned by European aerospace group EADS.

The probe has centered on action by co-pilot Sten Molin to stabilize the jet after it hit turbulence soon after takeoff.

The plane crashed into a New York neighborhood.

Airbushas disputed claims by American Airlines that it concealed design and safety information from the late 1990s that the airline says might have prevented the crash, according to news reports.

Fort Worth-based American has said Molin performed as he was trained, but the severity of the rudder movement was unintentional, Reuters reported.

Benzon said the rudder control system on the aircraft is sensitive and potentially hazardous at high speeds.

Airbus has made no changes to its A300-600 rudder system even though the safety board recommended one modification that was related to a 1997 incident, Reuters reported.


http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2004/10/25/daily28.html?jst=b_ln_hl

IMHO during Jim Hall's watch, Airbus would have been given more of the responsibility for the crash. This sounds a little political to me.

The World's No.1 Science & Technology News Service



Compounded errors caused New York crash


15:45 27 October 04

NewScientist.com news service

The second-worst crash in US aviation history was caused by "unnecessary and excessive" actions by the plane's co-pilot, who was in control of the plane at the time, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded on Tuesday.

But the board made it clear that both faulty design and bad training contributed strongly in leading the co-pilot to his tragically incorrect actions, which caused the American Airlines flight 587's tail to break off.

The plane crashed soon after takeoff from New York's JFK airport in 2001, just two months after the September 11 attacks, killing all 260 people on board and five on the ground. There was initial speculation that it might have been another terrorist incident. The board has decisively ruled out that scenario.

Problems began for the plane - an Airbus A300-600 - when it encountered wake turbulence left behind by a 747 jumbo jet that had taken off immediately before - a common occurrence in busy airports. And in this case, the board concluded, the turbulence would have been no problem if the co-pilot had not used the rudder at all, which is the normal course of action.


Extreme manoeuvres


But a training programme by American Airlines not only failed to prepare the co-pilot for the true consequences of such turbulence and of various measures to compensate for it, it actually made things worse by leading him to expect far more disruption of the plane's motion than would really have occurred.

This led him to overcompensate, apparently believing that more extreme manoeuvres were required to control the plane.

Unknown to either the co-pilot or the airline's trainers, a change in the way the plane's rudder mechanism worked seriously worsened the problem. The change made the rudder control pedals far more sensitive than any other plane's - including other Airbus models - and the sensitivity increased dramatically with speed. This is exactly the circumstance where excessive use of the rudder can cause high stresses on it.

The five-member board were split 3-2 as to whether the design flaw or the "negative training" was the greater factor, with the majority blaming the design more. Pilots know that they cannot use the plane's rudder - normally used only while taxiing on the ground - above a certain speed, known as the manoeuvring speed, in this case 250 knots.


But most apparently thought that it was safe to use the rudder to its full extent right up to that speed - something the plane's designers knew was not the case. In fact, pushing the rudder first to one extreme and then the other, as in flight 587's case, exposed it to stresses that were double its design limits.

The Airbus A300 has a tail made of lightweight composite materials, which is still relatively new in commercial airliner design, and some analysts had suggested this accident might point to risks in the use of such materials.

But the board emphatically disputed that conclusion. In fact, NTSB materials engineer Matt Fox, who conducted detailed tests on the remains of the rudder, says he knew of no other aircraft whose rudder could have withstood the forces the tragic flight was exposed to.

Board member Carol Carmody agrees, saying that after reviewing the test results "I was surprised by the strength and durability of the material."


David L Chandler

http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99996589

Here is the actual press release from the NTSB:

NTSB PRESS RELEASE
************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: October 26, 2004
SB-04-31

************************************************************

NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO
CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN &
ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED

************************************************************

WASHINGTON, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were
characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.

At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587,an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the
ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.

The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from
the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding
Boeing 747 for the second time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate
design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)

The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.

The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence
encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.

The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced
Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at
higher speeds.

In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.

The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake
turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned
the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)

The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's
report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300-600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French
equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery
training.

Because this crash occurred two months after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any
law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were
most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at www.ntsb.gov. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.

March 21, 2005

France Issues Emergency AD On Airbus Rudders

By Russ Niles
Newswriter, Editor

First it was voluntary, but it now appears airlines operating A300 and A310 aircraft will be compelled to conduct thorough inspections of the planes' composite rudders. France's civil aviation regulator has issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive calling for the one-time visual and tap-test inspection to be completed within 550 hours or before June 18. Other countries generally adopt similar Emergency ADs but none had been issued by the FAA at our deadline. France's action comes two weeks after an Air Transat A310 lost almost its entire rudder while at cruise on a trip from Cuba to Quebec. The crew was able to return to Varadero Airport and land safely. Last week Airbus recommended operators of A300 and A310 aircraft inspect the rudders. The NTSB and FAA are both following the Canadian investigation to see if it might have any bearing on the crash of an American Airlines A300 in New York in 2001. In that accident, the whole tail separated after what the NTSB determined were excessive rudder movements by the flying pilot.


http://www.avweb.com/newswire/11_12a/briefs/189391-1.html

Remember too after the crash in N.Y.C., American Airline pilots didn't want to fly the A300 anymore. They were convinced there was something very wrong with the design of that aircraft. It appears they may have been right. Not that I personally ever doubted their opinion.

I found this on Stuart's Yahoo Aviation site:


From Aero-News.net

"FAA To Order Airbus Rudder Inspections

Order Affects Owners Of 112 A300s, A310s

The FAA Friday ordered detailed inspections of Airbus A300 and A310
rudders, in the aftermath of a rudder separation aboard a Canadian
airliner earlier this month.

One hundred of those aircraft are flown by FedEx. Many of the others
are flown by American.
"To date, we have seen no indication of any irregularities in our
aircraft," the company said in a statement. There was no immediate
comment from American.

The move came after a Canadian Air Transat flight from Cuba to Quebec
City lost virtually its entire rudder in flight. The aircraft was able
to return to Cuba for an uneventful landing.

The Canadian TSB is looking into the separation with the NTSB in
Washington keeping close tabs on the investigation."